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Dara E. Purvis* and Melissa Blanco**
A woman alleges that she was raped by a police officer while in
police custody. The police officer acknowledges that he had sexual
intercourse with the woman but argues that she consented to the
interaction. Despite the clear power imbalance and troubling context
of the sexual activity, in a majority of U.S. states, if the police officer
convinces even one member of a jury that their activity was
consensual, then the officer cannot be convicted. Consent is a defense
to allegations of sexual assault—even when the alleged assault occurs
while the victim is in the custody of the perpetrator.
Allegations that police officers have committed sexual assault
while on duty are shockingly prevalent and surprisingly
underanalyzed. Police sexual violence (PSV) is situated at the
intersection of two vital national conversations about police brutality
and sexual violence and harassment. This Article addresses PSV as the
product of both issues and recommends systemic solutions sounding in
both debates.
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The immediate problem PSV presents is that it is not made clearly
illegal by state law and police department regulation. The deeper
problem is that PSV is a symptom of broader cultural problems within
police departments that can be helpfully parsed through the lens of
masculinities theories. PSV springs from issues both with how police
officers relate to the communities they patrol, especially men in those
communities, and with how police officers and police culture treat
women. The famous “blue wall of silence,” ensuring loyalty even
among police officers who commit misconduct, magnifies these issues.
Any attempt to meaningfully address PSV must take all of these factors
into account to work both a legal and a cultural change. This Article
offers such solutions, addressing substantive and procedural
prohibitions of PSV and broader cultural changes to police
departments to combat PSV at its roots.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2017, two New York City police officers, Eddie Martins and
Richard Hall, were charged with kidnapping and raping Anna Chambers,1 an
eighteen-year-old woman whom the officers had taken into custody.2 Chambers
was sitting in a parked car around 7:30 to 8:00 at night with two male friends
when the two police officers pulled up in a van.3 The two police officers flashed
their badges as they approached Chambers and her two friends.4 The police
officers handcuffed Chambers, but told her friends that they were “free to go.”5
Chambers recounted that the police officers took her into the van and each raped
her while she was handcuffed and crying.6 About an hour later, the police officers
dropped Chambers off near the area where they picked her up.7 Shortly after,
Chambers and her mother went to a hospital where a nurse conducted a rape kit.8
The rape kit matched Martins’s and Hall’s DNA.9
In January 2016, former Oklahoma City police officer Daniel Holtzclaw
was sentenced to 263 years in prison for raping and assaulting eight women of
color who reported that Holtzclaw sexually assaulted them between December
2013 and June 2014.10 Another five women also reported similar assaults for
which Holtzclaw was not convicted.11 One characteristic offense took place on
June 17, 2014, when Holtzclaw stopped and questioned a seventeen-year-old
Black woman for unknown reasons.12 After questioning her, Holtzclaw learned
that the teenager had an outstanding arrest warrant for trespassing and reportedly
told her to “take care of it before she turned 18 years old.”13 Later that day,
1. This is not her real name, but this is the name she goes by on social media. See Albert
Samaha, An 18-Year-Old Said She Was Raped While in Police Custody. The Officers Say She
Consented., BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertsamaha/this-teenageraccused-two-on-duty-cops-of-rape-she-had-no [https://perma.cc/LW4Y-CZKQ].
2. Editorial, Close the Police Rape Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2018, at A20,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/opinion/police-rape-loophole.html
[https://perma.cc/A2H2B9B7].
3. See Samaha, supra note 1.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, LDF Urges Systemic Reforms to Eliminate Police
Sexual Misconduct Following Sentencing of Daniel Holtzclaw, Former Oklahoma Police Officer,
LEGAL DEF. FUND (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldf-urges-systemic-reformsto-eliminate-police-sexual-misconduct-following-sentencing-of-daniel-holtzclaw-former-oklahomapolice-officer/ [https://perma.cc/SX6W-RXCM]; see also Kyle Schwab, Last Accuser Tells Jurors
Former Police Officer Raped Her on Mom’s Porch in Northwest Oklahoma City, THE OKLAHOMAN
(Dec. 1, 2015), http://newsok.com/article/5464087 [https://perma.cc/DY4V-PSQU].
11. See Joseph Diaz et al., Ex-Oklahoma City Cop Spending 263 Years in Prison for Rape and
His Accusers Share Their Stories, ABC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2016), https://abcnews.go.com/US/oklahomacity-cop-spending-263-years-prison-rape/story?id=38517467 [https://perma.cc/R2UR-GYH9].
12. See Schwab, supra note 10.
13. See id.

1490

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1487

Holtzclaw again made contact with the teenager and drove her to her mother’s
house.14 When the two arrived, Holtzclaw followed her to the porch.15 There,
under the pretense of searching her, Holtzclaw “stuck his hands up under [her]
shirt, under [her] bra and touched [her] breasts.”16 Afterwards, Holtzclaw turned
the teenager around and raped her on her mother’s porch.17
Both the Chambers and Holtzclaw allegations are examples of police sexual
violence (PSV). While studies do not yet capture the full extent of PSV, 18 we do
know that it is widespread, underreported, and under addressed.19 What makes
the Chambers and Holtzclaw cases remarkable, in other words, is not that
members of the public were sexually assaulted by the very officers sworn to
protect them. What makes these examples unusual is that they were actually
reported and that one of the officers was held accountable for his crimes.20

14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Most reports refer to PSV as “police sexual misconduct” (“PSM”). However, this Article
will argue that police officers sexually assaulting arrestees in their custody is not mere misconduct, but
rather an act of violence. For the purposes of consistency and for the sake of argument, any reference to
PSV herein is synonymous with behavior traditionally recognized as PSM.
19. See Nancy Phillips et al., Extorting Sex with a Badge, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 13, 2006),
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special_packages/inquirer/Extorting_sex_with_a_badge.html
[https://perma.cc/K76H-ST9J] (“Hundreds of police officers across the country have turned from
protectors to predators, using the power of their badge to extort sex, an Inquirer review shows . . . . Most
police departments do little to identify the offenders, and even less to stop them.”). Just recently, former
Auburn, California police officer, Joseph James DeAngelo, was arrested in connection with a serious of
killings, rapes, and assaults that transpired in the 1970s and 1980s. See Ray Sanchez et al., After
Searching for More than 40 Years, Authorities Say an Ex-Cop is the Golden State Killer, CNN (Apr.
27,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/25/us/golden-state-killer-development/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8MVA-Q7BS]. DeAngelo was a police officer with the Auburn Police Department
and the Exeter Police Department for six years, and authorities believe it is “[v]ery possibl[e]” that he
committed some of the crimes during his time as a police officer. Id. Exeter Police Chief, John Hall,
commented on the possibility that DeAngelo committed some of the crimes while acting as a police
officer, stating, “It is absolutely shocking that someone can commit such heinous crimes, and finding
out someone in a position of trust could betray that is absolutely unbelievable.” Id. DeAngelo faces
capital murder charges and is being held without bail in Sacramento. Id.
20. See Cara E. Trombadore, Police Officer Sexual Misconduct: An Urgent Call to Action in a
Context Disproportionately Threatening Women of Color, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 153,
155 (2016) (explaining that the Holtzclaw case “is unique in that it resulted in a criminal conviction and
substantial penalty . . . .”). Prosecutors withdrew the original charges against the officers in Anna
Chambers’s case and refiled charges of bribery and official misconduct. See Christina Carrega, Charges
Dropped Against Ex-NYPD Officers Accused of Raping a Teen in Custody, ABC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/charges-dropped-nypd-officers-accused-raping-teencustody/story?id=61540692 [https://perma.cc/H8HU-GA3Z]. Both officers were eventually sentenced
to five years of probation. See Andrew Denney, Ex-NYPD Cops Get Five Years’ Probation for Having
Sex with Teen in Custody, NY POST (Oct. 10, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/10/10/ex-nypd-cops-get5-years-probation-for-having-sex-with-teen-in-custody/ [https://perma.cc/5G6Y-KE3N].
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The scale of PSV is staggering. A 2010 Cato Institute study found that PSV
is the second-most reported form of police misconduct, after excessive force.21
Multiple studies indicate that women of color have been disproportionately
affected by PSV for years.22 PSV victims23 often do not report their assaults to
the police,24 which suggests that the rate of PSV occurrence is even higher than
existing reports indicate.25 PSV victims likely do not report their attacks for
several reasons; including fear of retaliation, fear that no one will believe them,
and fear that they will be blamed for the encounter.26 In the Holtzclaw case, for
example, most of the victims did not report the assaults until Jannie Ligons—a
fifty-seven-year-old woman who, unlike all the other victims, was not poor—
became the first woman to report her assault.27 It was only after the initial
investigation began and investigators reached out to other potential victims,
reassuring them that their allegations would be taken seriously, that others were
willing to make allegations against Holtzclaw on the record. 28 Because victims
of PSV do not believe that the police will protect them—indeed, a police officer
has just committed violence against them—they do not report assaults to the
police. Additionally, as one of Holtzclaw’s victims suggested, PSV victims
likely do not know where to report or have any place in which they can report
21. CATO INST., NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT STATISTICS AND REPORTING PROJECT,
ANN. REP. (2010), (on file with author) (“Sexual misconduct was the second most common form of
misconduct reported throughout 2010 with 618 officers involved in sexual misconduct complaints
during that period, 354 of which were involved in complaints that involved forcible non-consensual
sexual activity such as sexual assault or sexual battery.”).
22. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 168.
23. Both the terms “victim” and “survivor” are often used to refer to people who have
experienced sexual violence, and individual preferences differ from person to person. Compare Jan van
Dijk, Free the Victim: A Critique of the Western Conception of Victimhood, 16 INT’L REV.
VICTIMOLOGY 1, 2–3 (2009) with Danielle Campoamor, I’m Not a Sexual Assault “Survivor”–I’m a
Victim,
HARPER’S
BAZAAR
(May
21,
2018),
https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/features/a20138398/stop-using-survivor-to-describe-sexualassault-victims/ [https://perma.cc/YTK4-G99A]. The word victim is often specifically used in the
context of criminal law. See SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT INITIATIVE, VICTIM OR SURVIVOR: TERMINOLOGY
FROM INVESTIGATION THROUGH PROSECUTION, https://sakitta.org/toolkit/docs/Victim-or-SurvivorTerminology-from-Investigation-Through-Prosecution.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5UZ-FSKE]. Another
distinction is that victim refers to someone who has experienced sexual violence, where survivor may
mean an individual who has moved through the process of recovery. See RAINN, KEY TERMS AND
PHRASES, https://www.rainn.org/articles/key-terms-and-phrases [https://perma.cc/2ACF-GYAA]. For
these reasons, we use “victim” throughout this article.
24. See Zoë Carpenter, The Police Violence We Aren’t Talking About, NATION (Aug. 27, 2014),
https://www.thenation.com/article/police-violence-we-arent-talking-about/ [https://perma.cc/XXG2M2L2] (interviewing an advocate of the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network who said, “Sexual
assault is one of the most underreported crimes, and against police officers it’s probably even less
reported”).
25. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 167 (explaining that the structural barriers precluding
further research and understanding about PSV suggests that “the data currently available represents a
fraction of a larger picture”).
26. See id. at 166, 155.
27. See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1501 (2016).
28. See id; Trombadore, supra note 20, at 154.
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PSV. 29 Consequently, PSV remains underreported and under-researched despite
statistics revealing its high rate of occurrence.30
The problem is compounded by a lack of regulation, which offers police
officers a legal defense that might seem absurd: consent. Despite the numerous
studies highlighting the dangers of PSV, several states do not prohibit sexual
activity between police officers and people in custody.31 In February 2018,
BuzzFeed published an article identifying thirty-five states that do not explicitly
prohibit law enforcement officers from having sexual contact with people in their
custody.32 Chambers’s attorney, Michael David, similarly reported that at the
time of the case, thirty-two states did not have laws expressly prohibiting the
conduct.33 In such states, police officers accused of sexual assault can claim
“consent” as a defense.34 Accordingly, despite the clear power imbalance
between a police officer and a member of the public that the officer has stopped,
questioned, held in custody, and perhaps even arrested, the officer can argue in
response to a charge of sexual assault that their victim consented to the sexual
activity.35
The epidemic of PSV, both in scale and in concept, is startlingly
underanalyzed. Sexual assaults committed by police against members of the
public operate at the intersection of two vital national conversations about police
brutality and sexual violence and harassment. This Article is the first to fully
address PSV as the product of both issues and to recommend systemic solutions
sounding in both debates, including key insights from the study of masculinities.
The immediate problem PSV presents is that it is not made clearly illegal
by state law and police department regulation. The deeper concern is that PSV is
a symptom of broader cultural problems within police departments that can be
helpfully parsed through the lens of masculinities theories. PSV arises from
issues both with how police officers relate to the communities they patrol,
especially men in those communities, and with how police officers and police
culture treat women. The famous “blue wall of silence” ensuring loyalty even
among police officers who commit misconduct magnifies these issues. Any

29. See Schwab, supra note 10.
30. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 155–56 (citing Danielle McGurrin & Victor E. Kappeler,
Media Accounts of Police Sexual Violence: Rotten Apples or State-Supported Violence, in POLICING
AND MISCONDUCT 121, 222 (Kim Michelle Lersch ed., 2002)).
31. See Samaha, supra note 1.
32. Id.
33. See James Ford, Woman Who Accused 2 NYPD Detectives of Raping Her Speaks Out, PIX
11 (Apr. 5, 2018), http://pix11.com/2018/04/05/anna-chambers-woman-who-accused-2-nypddetectives-of-raping-her-while-in-custody-faces-them-and-speaks-out/
[https://perma.cc/W7AZQ6P3].
34. See Samaha, supra note 1.
35. Not all sexual assault committed by police officers is perpetrated by male police officers,
and not all victims of PSV are female. As will be discussed further in Part III infra, the most common
and often most vulnerable victims of PSV are women, particularly women of color and transgender
women. Still, so as not to leave any experiences out, this Article will use gender-neutral pronouns.
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attempt to meaningfully address PSV must take all of these factors into account
to work both a legal and a cultural change. This Article offers such a solution.
The Article begins with a comprehensive accounting of the problem of
PSV: assessing the limited statistics regarding the prevalence of PSV and
canvassing existing state laws prohibiting PSV.36 Part I addresses the power
dynamic between police officers and members of the public in custody, adopting
a vocabulary of expressed versus subjective intent to explain why actual consent
in such a context is impossible. Part II then examines the deeper causes of PSV
through the frame of masculinities. It uses the concept of “hegemonic
masculinity” to explain the multiple ways in which police officer-civilian
interactions are affected by police officers’ attempts to gain status with other
men, particularly their fellow officers. Part III turns to a path forward,
recommending substantive and procedural reforms to law and police department
policy as well as proscriptive recommendations about how to shift police
department culture.
I.
THE EPIDEMIC OF PSV
While PSV has gained national attention recently, PSV has been an
underreported epidemic, disproportionately affecting women of color living in
lower socioeconomic areas. Any analysis of PSV must begin by assessing how
commonly it occurs, as well as whom it most commonly affects.
A. Defining PSV
PSV is an umbrella term that encompasses any coercion committed by a
police officer with a sexualized component.37 This spans a wide range of acts,
“from sexual harassment and extortion to forcible rape by officers.”38 Although
a uniform legal definition of PSV does not currently exist, New York’s Policy
and Advocacy Unit of the Civilian Complaint Review Board provides a helpful
example, defining PSV as:
[V]erbal harassment of someone because of that person’s sex, gender
identity, or sexual orientation, as well as conduct involving the actual or

36. See infra Part II.B.
37. Scholars writing about PSV have used different terms, including police sexual misconduct
as well as police sexual violence. Some commenters use the terms to distinguish between allegedly
transactional exchanges of sexual activity and a police officer using discretion not to arrest or otherwise
punish a member of the public and violent interactions in which the victim argued no consent took place.
Because this Article argues that consent is impossible in sexual interactions between members of the
public and police officers, it uses PSV in its broadest sense. For a helpful summary of this distinction,
see Trombadore, supra note 20, at 171–72.
38. Andrea J. Ritchie, How Some Cops Use the Badge to Commit Sex Crimes, WASH. POST.
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-some-cops-use-the-badge-to-commitsex-crimes/2018/01/11/5606fb26-eff3-11e7-b390a36dc3fa2842_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8d0bcabf4ae4 [https://perma.cc/52AJ-JPP5]
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threatened use of physical contact or force, including rape, assault,
unwanted touching, and other forms of physical sexual contact . . . with
witnesses, victims, and defendants with whom members of service come
into contact as a result of their job assignments.39
The U.S. Department of Justice similarly defines PSV as “sexual assault [by a
law enforcement officer] without consent (rape), sexual contact procured by
force, threat of force or coercion, and unwanted or gratuitous sexual contact such
as touching or groping.”40 Most states, scholars, and scholarly reports, however,
either do not define PSV at all or define the violence in very different ways. 41
This lack of uniformity in defining PSV may be one reason why PSV has not
been adequately addressed by state legislatures.42 Without a specific definition
of PSV, legislatures may have difficulty conceptualizing the root of the problem,
and thus, how to address it through the law.43
B. Prevalence of PSV
Because of the differing definitions of PSV, as well as other issues such as
underreporting, it is functionally impossible to establish how many incidents of
PSV occur per year. Even assuming under-inclusion and underreporting,
however, numbers of reported incidents of sexual violence committed by police
officers are disturbingly high. One six-year study conducted between 2009 and
2014 revealed that nearly one thousand police officers nationwide lost their
licenses as a result of sexual violence allegations.44 Notably, the study surveyed
only “state and local police, sheriff’s officials, prison guards and school resource
officers,”45 not federal officers. The study revealed that, of the nearly one
thousand police officers who lost their license as a result of sexual violence, 549
police officers lost their licenses based on allegations of sexual assault or rape.46
Of those 549 police officers, 154 of them sexually assaulted prisoners.47 The
study does not go into detail about how many police officers, if any, lost their
license as a result of sexually assaulting a person in their custody.48
Buffalo News conducted a similar national study that revealed more than
seven hundred credible cases of PSV in a span of ten years, ranging from 2005

39. Memorandum from N.Y.’s Policy & Advocacy Unit of the Civil Complaint Review Bd. 1
(Feb. 14, 2018) (on file with author).
40. Law Enforcement Misconduct, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 28, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/law-enforcement-misconduct#sex [https://perma.cc/B8FB-5NCS]
41. Trombadore, supra note 20, at 163.
42. See id. at 175.
43. See id. (“[U]nity in problem formulation has the potential to mobilize entire movements.”).
44. See AP Investigation into Officer Sex Misconduct, by the Numbers, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Oct. 31, 2015), https://apnews.com/f61d495bb41d47968679c5b89a9907fc [https://perma.cc/8FREFFX8].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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to 2015.49 The study concluded that in more than 70 percent of the seven hundred
cases, “officers wielded their authority over motorists, crime victims,
informants, students and young people in job-shadowing programs.”50 Of the
police officers named in the data, only five offenders were women.51 Nearly all
of the victims were women and adolescents.52 Former police officer Timothy
Maher stated that these numbers are “just the tip of the iceberg.”53
Reported numbers fail to capture the actual number of PSV incidents for
several reasons. One reason focuses on the status of the perpetrators: victims feel
that other police officers will not view their allegations as reliable. Victims are
understandably hesitant to report PSV when the entity to which the victim would
typically file a claim is their abuser’s place of employment.54 For obvious
reasons, victims believe their abuser’s employment and the loyalty of his
coworkers will prevent their claims from being taken seriously. One of
Holtzclaw’s victims, for example, explained “I didn’t think that [anyone] would
believe me. I feel like all police will work together.”55 When asked why she did
not report the rape to the police, another of Holtzclaw’s victims stated, “‘What’s
the good of telling on the police? . . . What kind of police do you call on the
police?’”56 These testimonies are illustrative of the distrust victims feel when
their abuser is a police officer, tainting the trust that they might otherwise feel
that reporting the crime will lead to an investigation and arrest. 57
There is even reason to believe that occasional media attention on
horrifying examples of PSV, such as Holtzclaw’s crimes, further discourages
victims of PSV, and possibly victims of all crimes, to report them. Sociologists
Matthew Desmond, Andrew Papachristos, and David Kirk analyzed how often
members of the public called 911 to report crimes in Milwaukee in the wake of
a highly publicized example of police brutality against a Black man.58 They
concluded that “publicized cases of police violence against unarmed [B]lack men
have a clear and significant impact on citizen crime reporting.”59 According to
their study, individuals living in predominantly Black neighborhoods were less
likely to call 911 to report crimes for a year following the media coverage,

49. See Matthew Spina, When a Protector Becomes a Predator, BUFF. NEWS (Nov. 22, 2015),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/bncore/projects/abusing-the-law/index.html
[https://perma.cc/B5H7D2M8].
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. (“Victims may be even less likely to report [PSV] offenses when they fear it will be
their word versus an officer’s.”).
55. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 154.
56. Schwab, supra note 10.
57. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 166.
58. Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black
Community, 81 AMER. SOC. REV. 857 (2016).
59. Id. at 870.
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resulting in twenty thousand fewer calls to the police.60 It seems logical that
victims of PSV would follow a similar pattern and be even less likely to report
their assault in the wake of news, for example, that the officers accused of raping
Anna Chambers received only probation.
Another central reason for underreporting is the identity of the victims most
commonly assaulted by perpetrators of PSV. The victimology of PSV is deeply
intersectional61 as police officers typically “target the most vulnerable—namely
women of color, transgender and gender-nonconforming people, victims of
domestic abuse, and people suspected of engaging in criminalized activity—to
reduce the risk that their misconduct will be reported . . . .”62 Police officers
generally target these vulnerable groups because the groups are “often perceived
as less credible,”63 and thus are unlikely to succeed in reporting a police officer
for PSV.64 A member of the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network advocacy
group explained that police officers prey on these groups of people by making
comments such as, “If you report me, then I’m going to report that you were
breaking X, Y, or Z law.”65
Unsurprisingly, PSV disproportionately affects women of color.66 A
number of cultural and historical reasons combine to make women of color,
particularly Black women and girls, especially vulnerable to PSV. Sexual
exploitation of Black women by White men in formal positions of power over
them has been a shameful part of this nation’s history since slavery.67 This
exploitation is worsened by stereotypes and revisionist history that sexualizes
Black women and girls, characterizing them as more likely to have consented to
what was in fact a sexual assault.68 Given the communities that are more likely

60. See id.
61. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991).
62. Trombadore, supra note 20, at 158–59.
63. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, ADDRESSING SEXUAL OFFENSES AND
MISCONDUCT
BY
LAW
ENFORCEMENT:
EXECUTIVE
GUIDE
4
(2011),
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/all/a/AddressingSexualOffensesandMisconductbyLawEnfor
cementExecutiveGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/57ZW-468J].
64. See Steven Yoder, Officers Who Rape: The Police Brutality Chiefs Ignore, AL JAZEERA
(Jan. 19, 2016), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/1/19/sexual-violence-the-brutality-thatpolice-chiefs-ignore.html [https://perma.cc/4F32-G8EH].
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also Tasha Fierce, Black Women are Beaten, Sexually Assaulted and Killed by
Police.
Why
Don’t
We
Talk
About
It?,
ALTERNET
(Feb.
26,
2015),
https://www.alternet.org/activism/black-women-are-beaten-sexually-assaulted-and-killed-police-whydont-we-talk-about-it [https://perma.cc/UTP2-HHKM] (“Black women are disproportionately targeted
by police and face the threat of not only being shot, but of being sexually assaulted.”).
67. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 168. (“Sexual exploitation of [B]lack women in the
United States can be traced to slavery, for it is well-established that [B]lack women ‘endured rape, forced
breeding and physical assaults as a means for profit and brute intimidation.”).
68. Id.
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to have repeated interactions with law enforcement69 and the ongoing role of
purported consent in PSV, it is unsurprising that Black women have been
disproportionately victimized by PSV.
Black women, of course, are not the only women of color that are
disproportionately affected by PSV. Latinx women, American Indian and Alaska
Native women, and LGBTQ+ women also face a higher risk of sexual assault
than heterosexual White women.70 All of these groups of women have
historically been sexually exploited and otherwise marginalized, making
victimization and oppression more common and less likely to be punished.71
While women generally are disproportionately impacted by rape and sexual
assault,72 women of color run an even higher risk of rape or sexual assault as a
result of their race and their gender.73 Although approximately 60 percent of the
population identifies as White,74 only 18 percent of rape victims are White. The
rate of victimization of nonwhite people is strikingly disproportionate to their
numbers in the overall population.75
The particular vulnerability of women of color, however, is not meant to
exclude men, specifically men of color, who have also been targets of PSV. One
of the most notorious examples of PSV occurred in August 1997, when a Haitian
man named Abner Louima was arrested and taken back to the police station,
where two New York Police Department officers brutally sodomized him with a
broomstick.76 Louima suffered from a ruptured bladder and colon, causing him
to spend two months in the hospital.77 The two officers were only sentenced to a
69. See Carbado, supra note 27, at 1490 (“[P]olice officers can almost always find a justification
to investigate an African-American for some crime.”).
70. See id; Trombadore, supra note 20, at 169.
71. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 168–69.
72. See Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victimssexual-violence [https://perma.cc/JF5R-7QPJ] (explaining that 90 percent of adult rape victims are
female while one in every ten rape victims are male).
73. See Prevalence Rates, END RAPE ON CAMPUS, https://endrapeoncampus.org/new-page-3
[https://perma.cc/B5C5-D7W9].
74. Quick
Facts,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217#qf-headnote-b [https://perma.cc/CTW7SXZN].
75. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2010 SUMMARY REPORT, NATIONAL
INTIMATE
PARTNER
AND
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
SURVEY
83
(2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5GM2CG9].
76. See K.C. Baker et al., Two Cops Charged for Torturing Abner Louima With a Broomstick
in 1997, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2017), http://beta.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/2-copseyed-sex-assault-70th-pct-suspect-brutalized-article-1.785482 [https://perma.cc/8QP6-YP5K]. Unlike
Chambers’s and Holtzclaw’s attacks, Louima’s assault was appropriately labeled “police brutality.”
Another reason this Article uses PSV rather than PSM is to emphasize that women, specifically those
of color, being sexually assaulted at the hands of police officers should be labeled “police brutality”
rather than mere misconduct.
77. See Sewell Chan, The Abner Louima Case, 10 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM (Aug.
9,
2007),
https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/the-abner-louima-case-10-years-later/
[https://perma.cc/BF36-HVTZ].
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few years of probation.78 Louima’s assault has become one of the most famous
examples of sexual assault of a male victim, and an exception to widespread
dismissal or even laughing reactions to male victims of sexual assault.79
Even police officers recognize that PSV is a widespread and significant
problem.80 Norm Stamper, a former Seattle police chief, published a book in
which he stated, “You won’t find a major law enforcement agency that has been
around for more than five minutes that has not had a chapter in its history of
sexual abuse by a police officer on duty. We’ve got too many rapists in
uniform.”81 Penny Harrington, former police chief of Portland, Oregon, and
founder of the National Center for Women and Policing, also implicitly
acknowledged the problem when she said, “The women are terrified . . . . Who
are they going to call? It’s the police who are abusing them.”82 Finally, Sarasota
Police Chief Bernadette DiPino remarked, “It’s happening in probably every law
enforcement agency across the country.”83
Despite current and former police officers in high positions of power
acknowledging this problem, state legislatures have failed to adequately address
the issue. And in spite of the underreporting of PSV discussed briefly above,
PSV is still the second-most reported form of police violence, after excessive
force.84 Until legislatures recognize the importance and immediate harm this
issue poses to people subjected to the criminal justice system, “women will
continue to pay a heavy price.”85 The next Section turns to what statutes currently
exist that address PSV and why they are inadequate.
C. Current Laws Prohibiting PSV and an Introduction to the Power
Dynamic
In all fifty states, it remains a crime for anyone, including law enforcement
officers, to commit sexual assault.86 However, approximately thirty states do not
have statutes expressly prohibiting sexual conduct between a law enforcement
officer and a person in custody.87 Albert Samaha’s BuzzFeed article discussing
78. See Alan Feuer, 2 Ex-Officers in Louima Case Get Probation for Lying, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
10, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/10/nyregion/2-ex-officers-in-louima-case-get-probationfor-lying.html [https://perma.cc/3GBA-AC7X]. Remarkably, Louima won $8.7 million in settlements
following the attack. See Chan, supra note 77.
79. See Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1261–64 (2011).
80. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 160–61.
81. Id. at 161.
82. See Phillips et al., supra note 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See CATO INST., supra note 21 and accompanying text.
85. Katharine Bodde & Erika Lorshbough, There’s No Such Thing as ‘Consensual Sex’ When
a Person is in Police Custody, N.Y. C.L. UNION (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.nyclu.org/en/news/theresno-such-thing-consensual-sex-when-person-police-custody [https://perma.cc/2A9C-S3NQ].
86. See Andrea Ritchie, Survivors of Sexual Violence by Police Need More Than a Quick Fix,
REWIRE NEWS (Apr. 3, 2016), https://rewire.news/article/2018/04/03/survivors-sexual-violence-policeneed-quick-fix/ [https://perma.cc/4AUF-K46U] [hereinafter Ritchie, Quick Fix].
87. See Samaha, supra note 1.
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Anna Chambers’s case included a graphic identifying which states specifically
prohibited police officers from having sexual contact with a member of the
public held in custody, showing only fifteen states with such a specific
prohibition.88 Since that article was published, several states have passed or
considered statutes attempting to address PSV, but a majority still lack any direct
prohibition.89
Existing statutes address the illegality of sexual contact between law
enforcement and members of the public in a variety of ways.90 Some states
explicitly say “law enforcement” or “peace officer” in definitions of prohibited
conduct, making clear that any sexual contact between a member of the police
and a member of the public is a crime. Arizona’s statute is one of the most
straightforward, stating that “[a] peace officer commits unlawful sexual conduct
by knowingly engaging in sexual contact, oral sexual contact or sexual
intercourse with any person who is in the officer’s custody or a person who the
officer knows or has reason to know is the subject of an investigation.”91
A number of statutes both name police officers and focus on persons in
custody. Alaska, for example, specifies that if “while employed in the state by a
law enforcement agency as a peace officer” the officer “engages in sexual
penetration with a person with reckless disregard that the person is in the custody
or the apparent custody of the offender, or is committed to the custody of a law
enforcement agency,” that officer has committed sexual assault in the third
degree.92 Hawaii similarly prohibits a law enforcement officer from “knowingly
subject[ing] to sexual penetration . . . a person in custody.”93 California forbids
“peace officer[s]” from engaging in sexual activity with anyone “confined in a
detention facility,” which includes interview and interrogation rooms as well as
vehicles used to transport people after their arrest.94
Other states use a broader description of the circumstances in which sexual
activity is not permitted than when a person is in custody. For example, Kansas
lists “traffic stop, a custodial interrogation, an interview in connection with an
investigation, or while the law enforcement officer has such person detained” as
circumstances in which sexual contact between an officer and member of the

88. Id.
89. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.7 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5512 (2019); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 14:41.1 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-314 (West 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05
(2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3259 (West 2018).
90. The graphic labels Indiana as a state with a specific prohibition of sexual contact between
police officers and members of the public, but the authors were unable to locate a statute establishing
that offense. See Samaha, supra note 1.
91. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1412(A) (2020).
92. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.425(a)(4) (West 2019). If the officer engages in sexual contact,
rather than sexual penetration, the offense is sexual assault only in the fourth degree. ALASKA STAT.
ANN. § 11.41.427(a)(3) (West 2019).
93. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-731(1)(c)(v) (West 2020).
94. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289.6(a)(2) (West 2020).
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public is illegal.95 Florida specifies that any “law enforcement officer,
correctional officer, or correctional probation officer” is guilty of a felony if they
commit actions that fit under the general definition of sexual battery while they
are “acting in such a manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe that the
offender is in a position of control or authority as an agent or employee of
government.”96 Along similar lines, Colorado prohibits any peace officer from
having sexual activity with someone contacted “for the purpose of law
enforcement or . . . the exercise of the officer’s employment activities,” someone
who is or the officer causes to believe is the subject of an active investigation, or
someone to whom the officer makes “any show of real or apparent authority.”97
All of the above statutes specifically identify members of law enforcement
and prohibit a relatively broad range of sexual acts, although they display some
variety in whether the victim is in custody, the subject of an active investigation,
or simply subject to the police officer’s authority. By contrast, other states focus
more on the custodial aspect, rather than necessarily identifying law enforcement
officers specifically.98 North Carolina statutes simply prohibit:
[A] person having custody of a victim of any age or a person who is an
agent or employee of any person, or institution, whether such institution
is private, charitable, or governmental, having custody of a victim of
any age engag[ing] in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with such
victim . . . .99
Oregon defines a crime called “custodial sexual misconduct,” which occurs
where a state employee has sexual intercourse with a person “in the custody of a
law enforcement agency following arrest.”100 Washington is more specific,
establishing the same offense where “the perpetrator is a law enforcement
officer” and the victim is “detained, under arrest, or in the custody of a law
enforcement officer,” and further notes that “[c]onsent of the victim is not a
defense to prosecution.”101 Utah defines “custodial sexual relations” where the
victim is “a person in custody,” and similarly specifies that consent is not a
defense.102
Still more states tweak the custodial description slightly by emphasizing
control or other supervisory authority exercised by the perpetrator over their
victim, the approach suggested in the Model Penal Code.103 For example, Ohio
95. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5512 (2019)
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(4)(e)(7) (West 2019).
97. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-405.7(a), (c) (2019).
98. In addition to those quoted, see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:41.1 (2020); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-314 (West 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3259
(West 2018).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-27.31(b) (West 2019).
100. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.452(1), (1)(a)(A) (West 2020).
101. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.160(1)(a)(i)–(ii), (1)(b)(2) (West 2019).
102. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-412(2)(a)(ii)(A), (7)(b) (West 2020).
103. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.3–4 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Sections 213.0 to 213.11
2015).
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bans sexual conduct where one person is “in custody of law . . . and the offender
has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the other person.”104 North Dakota
prohibits sexual contact between a person “in official custody or detained in a
hospital, prison, or other institution” and an actor who has “supervisory or
disciplinary authority over that other person.”105 New Jersey includes in its
definition of sexual assault circumstances where “[t]he victim is on probation or
parole, or detained in a hospital, prison or other institution and the actor has
supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor’s legal,
professional or occupational status.”106 Connecticut establishes that if someone
“is detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or
disciplinary authority over such other person,” the actor is guilty of sexual
assault.107 Georgia states that someone “who has supervisory or disciplinary
authority over another individual commits sexual assault” when the perpetrator
“[i]s an employee or agent of a law enforcement agency and engages in sexual
contact with such other individual who the actor knew or should have known is
contemporaneously . . . being detained by or is in the custody of any law
enforcement agency.”108 Oklahoma focuses on the victim, specifying that rape
has occurred “[w]here the victim is under the legal custody or supervision of a
state agency, a federal agency, a county, a municipality or a political subdivision
and engages in sexual intercourse with a state, federal, county, municipal or
political subdivision employee or an employee of a contractor of the state, the
federal government, a county, a municipality or a political subdivision that
exercises authority over the victim.”109 Notably, some states prohibit sexual
contact between a person with supervisory or disciplinary authority and a person
under that authority, but only where the person in authority uses that authority to
coerce the victim to submit.110
These states are the only ones that criminalize sexual activity between a
police officer and a member of the public. In the majority of states, only general
sexual assault statutes apply. Therefore, if a person in custody alleges that a
police officer sexually assaulted them, the police officer can raise consent as a
defense and argue that the sexual contact was consensual sexual activity rather
than sexual assault. This is particularly pernicious due to the assumption, in

104. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(6) (West 2020).
105. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-07(1)(d) (West 2020).
106. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(2) (West 2020).
107. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(a) (West 2019).
108. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(b), (b)(3) (West 2003).
109. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(7) (West 2019).
110. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(n) (West 2018) (“When the actor is in a
position of authority over the victim and uses this authority to coerce the victim to submit . . . .”); T ENN.
C ODE A NN. § 39-13-527(a)(3)(A) (West 1955) (“The defendant was at the time of the offense in a
position of trust, or had supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the defendant’s
legal, professional or occupational status and used the position of trust or power to accomplish the sexual
contact.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (West 2019) (“The actor is in a position of authority over
the victim and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to submit.”).
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“much of the policing literature” that “police are a desired sexual commodity
who are routinely tempted by women willing to trade ‘sexual favors’ for
leniency.”111
This defense is problematic because it ignores the power dynamic between
a police officer and a civilian in custody—a power dynamic that many have
argued “makes consent impossible.”112 New York Assemblyman Edward
Braunstein, who sponsored the successful New York bill, argued that “[t]he
power dynamic between an individual in custody and a law enforcement officer
is such that the person in custody is powerless to consent to sexual activity.” 113
The New York Civil Liberties Union counselors concluded the same, reasoning
that “[a]nyone in police custody implicitly understands . . . that not going along
with a police officer’s wishes could have serious adverse consequences.”114 The
next Section addresses the power dynamic between police officer and civilian in
more specificity.
1. The Power Dynamic: Law Enforcement Officers and “Consenting”
Civilians in Custody
While a definition of consent does not exist,115 there is a general
understanding that consent indicates a person’s willingness to engage in a
particular sexual act.116 There are two dimensions to this consent. First, there is
expressed consent: a verbal or physical manifestation of consent.117 Second,
there is subjective consent: the internal, subjective choice to engage in sexual
activity. Ideally, both expressed consent and subjective consent are present. In
some circumstances, however, this is not the case. For example, a person might
give expressed consent while not wanting to engage in sexual activity because
fear, threats, or coercion made them feel as if they had no choice. Conversely, a
person engaged in sadomasochistic practices might subjectively want sexual

111. Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, To Serve and Pursue: Exploring Police Sexual
Violence Against Women, 12 JUST. Q. 85, 88 (1995).
112. Bodde et al., supra note 85.
113. Assembly Passes Legislation to Prohibit Sexual Contact Between Police Officers and
Individuals in Custody, N.Y. ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLYMAN EDWARD C. BRAUNSTEIN ASSEMBLY DISTR.
26
(Feb.
7,
2018),
http://nyassembly.gov/mem/?ad=026&sh=story&story=79457
[https://perma.cc/4432-DUG9].
114. Bodde et al., supra note 85.
115. See Legal Role of Consent, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/legal-role-consent
[https://perma.cc/7K8E-HRQS] (“There is no single legal definition of consent.”).
116. See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
77, 117 (2010).
117. For conceptual purposes, expressed consent could arguably include permission that is
implied through the absence of protest, as opposed to affirmative consent.

2020]

POLICE SEXUAL VIOLENCE

1503

contact but—because of their preferences for masochistic role-playing—express
non-consent.118
PSV implicates both mismatches in ways that demonstrate the need for a
bright-line rule prohibiting sexual contact between an on duty police officer and
a member of the public. First, the nature of the relationship between a police
officer and a member of the public demonstrates why the risk of expressed but
not subjective consent is so high. When a police officer has a person in their
custody, the power the police officer holds over that civilian effectively makes
subjective intent irrelevant.
To determine whether a sexual act between a person in a position of power
and a person not similarly situated was consensual, the key question is whether
the victim participated in the sexual demands as a result of coercion. In the
context of a police officer and a person in custody, we argue that the potential
for coercion is so great that there can never be meaningful consent.119
Imagine an allegation of sexual assault against a police officer in which the
officer argues the sexual encounter was consensual. Assume that the factfinder
is convinced that the member of the public expressed consent. Even then, the
police officer’s control over the civilian renders subjective intent absent. As
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael has argued, the power imbalance means that any
purported consent is the product of a “one-sided abuse of power rather than
through mutual agreement.”120 Therefore, the outward appearance of permission
cannot be viewed as actual consent because it is “affected heavily by fears,
pressures, and constraints” resulting from the abuser’s power.121
This further implicates a distinction between nonconsensual and unwanted
sex. For example, Robin West defined a difference between the two:
Sometimes unwanted sex is non-consensual, and when it is, it is rape.
Sometimes, however, unwanted (or unwelcome or undesired) sex is
“consensual,” in all the ways that matter to law, and when such, it is not
rape, and . . . not the target of criminal rape law. However, even
consensual sex that is unwanted—meaning, unwanted sex that is not
rape—might nevertheless be harmful, injurious, and the product of not-

118. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent
and A New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 131 (2002) (describing a sexual assault case
involving claims of voluntary sadomasochistic activity). People who engage in sadomasochism describe
negotiating consent, however, as “a crucial aspect of their sexual play” and reject descriptions of
sadomasochism as nonconsensual. See id. at 135–36.
119. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 116, at 119.
120. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 116, at 117; see also Mark Treyger, There is No
Sexual
Consent
While
Under
Police
Custody,
MEDIUM
(Oct.
24,
2017),
https://medium.com/@councildistrict47/there-is-no-sexual-consent-while-under-police-custody7f58b9fdf33d [https://perma.cc/VPH5-2BCC] (“[T]he power dynamics between a trusted agent of our
criminal justice system and an individual under supervision mean that no sexual consent can be given
entirely free from coercion.”).
121. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 116, at 117.
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so-subtle background conditions of necessity and coercion . . . .122
West thus concluded that there are undeniably instances in which a person is
incapable of consenting to sexual activity. The law, however, does not currently
capture these situations—where there is a lack of subjective consent—if
expressed consent is arguably or theoretically present.123
PSV is a prime example of such unwanted sex. Undoubtedly, many
incidents of PSV are lacking both expressed and subjective consent. But given
the power differential between a police officer and a member of the public, the
risk of unwanted sex with expressed but not subjective consent is unacceptably
high. Even further, we argue that in the context of PSV, subjectively wanted sex
should be considered nonconsensual. In other words, even if it could be proven
that a person in custody actually expressed consent and acknowledged their
subjective consent, any sexual contact between that person and a police officer
holding them in custody should be considered PSV and illegal.
One justification for a bright-line rule is to avoid difficult evidentiary
determinations. Such determinations may rely upon biased judgments of the
credibility of sexual assault victims, particularly women.124 The power
imbalance inherent in the relationship between law enforcement officers and
civilians makes any type of consent suspect at best and functionally meaningless
at worst.
A second justification for a bright-line rule is a stronger statement of
principle: the context of a police officer holding a civilian in custody vitiates
consent. This may seem like an overly rigid rule, but similar bright-line rules
regarding consent apply in other comparable contexts.
The most familiar rule of strict liability regarding consent is probably
statutory rape. The crime of statutory rape is based on a simple concept: people
below a certain age are legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity.125 In
the majority of states, therefore, a person who has sexual intercourse with a
minor is guilty of statutory rape, even if the adult honestly believed that the minor
was over the age of consent.126 Although the simplicity of the rule is a useful
comparison, the justification for the rule is different in an important way: a minor
is considered less competent to make decisions regarding sexual activity than an
122. Robin L. West, Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 19 (2006)
(emphasis in original).
123. See id.
124. See generally Anderson, supra note 118 (discussing the historical and continuing use of rape
victims’ sexual history to impeach their credibility). One of us has previously written about another
context in which women’s statements about their own bodies are not believed; descriptions of pain as
part of disability claims. See Dara E. Purvis, A Female Disease: The Unintentional Gendering of
Fibromyalgia Social Security Claims, 21 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 85, 109–14 (2011).
125. See Erin K. Jackson, Addressing the Inconsistency Between Statutory Rape Laws and
Underage Marriage: Abolishing Early Marriage and Removing the Spousal Exemption to Statutory
Rape, 85 UMKC L. REV. 343, 361–64 (2017).
126. See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, The Paradox of Statutory Rape, 87
IND. L.J. 505, 517 (2012).
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adult. No such principle is applicable to people in the custody of law
enforcement, and the comparison raises potentially problematic assumptions
about female agency and sexual decision-making that historically undergirded
gendered statutory rape laws.127
A much closer analogy provides a clearer parallel: people held in prison.
Even jurisdictions that do not explicitly reject the concept of “consensual” sex
with a person in law enforcement custody generally recognize the imbalanced
power dynamic inherent in the custodial relationship between prisoners and
prison guards.128 These jurisdictions have implemented laws to protect
vulnerable persons from exploitation by corrections officers.129 Moreover,
“[s]ome United States district courts have concluded that the inherent
power differential between guards and inmates makes sexual relationships
between them coercive,” thereby deeming any sexual activity between them to
be nonconsensual.130
At the federal level, for example, the U.S. Congress implemented the Prison
Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA), which “established a ‘zero-tolerance
standard’ for rape in prisons in the United States.”131 Implementation of the
PREA underscores that “in a custodial context, consent is a legal
impossibility.”132 The federal government and a majority of states have since
followed suit by criminalizing sexual activity between prison workers and those
in their custody.133 The statutory language of such bans is explicit and clear. For
example, multiple states say outright that purported consent of an inmate is not
a defense to alleged violations of the statute.134 Proposed revisions to the Model
Penal Code similarly criminalize sexual contact between someone who “holds
any position of authority or supervision” over a victim “detained in a . . .

127. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV.
387, 404–06 (1984).
128. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-701 (2019).
129. See id. (detailing that an inmate is incapable of consenting to sexual acts with a correction
officer).
130. Merideth J. Hogan, If Orange is the New Black, is Coercion the New Consent? An Analysis
of the Tenth Circuits Decision to Allow Guards to Use an Inmate’s Alleged Consent as a Defense in a
Sexual Abuse Allegation [Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013)], 54
WASHBURN L.J. 425, 425–26 (2015).
131. Implementing the Prison Rape Elimination Act, Presidential Memorandum, 77 Fed. Reg.
20873 (May 17, 2012), appended to 34 U.S.C. § 30301 (2018).
132. Deborah M. Golden, It’s Not in My Head: The Harm of Rape and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 39 (2004).
133. See id. at 40 n. 16 (listing statutes).
134. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3017(a) (West 2001) (stating specifically that “[c]onsent is
not a defense to a prosecution under §§ 22-3013 to 22-3016”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.35(3)(b)(3) (West
2019) (prohibiting sexual activity, defined therein, between inmates and prison guards, and specifically
stating that “[t]he consent of the inmate or offender supervised by the department in the community to
any act of sexual misconduct may not be raised as a defense to a prosecution under this paragraph”);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-332.01 (2006) (explaining that consent is not a defense to “sexual penetration or
sexual conduct”).
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custodial institution” or has a “status involving state-imposed restrictions on
liberty.”135
Despite formally recognizing the power imbalance between inmates and
prison guards, only a handful of states explicitly prohibit sexual activity between
law enforcement officers and those in their custody.136 Even fewer states
explicitly codify that consent is not a defense to such sexual activity. 137 Yet a
police officer’s relationship with a person in custody is comparable to the
relationship between a prison guard and a prisoner. Most importantly, and most
obviously, police officers have a custodial relationship with an arrestee similar
to that between a prison guard and a prisoner. A police officer has the ability to
deprive someone of their liberty if they are accused (or threatened with a charge)
of breaking a law.138 Because of the power dynamic resulting from the
relationship between police officers and those in their custody, as well as prison
guards and prisoners, consent to sexual activity under the pressure of the criminal
justice system is not possible.139
One response to this conclusion is to argue that a bright-line rule stating
that a member of the public cannot consent to sexual activity with a police officer
takes away the agency and autonomy of a member of the public who actually
wants to engage in the sexual activity.140 This is true to the extent that their
consent would be rendered effectively meaningless for certain types of
interactions. If a member of the public wishes to engage in sexual activity with
a police officer, however, they would be free to do so when that officer is off
duty. Given the substantial risk of unwanted sexual activity as described above,
it is a comparably small restriction on the rights of both police officers and their
willing sexual partners to require that any sexual interactions take place in a
context that guarantees meaningful consent.
2. Police Departments’ Policies (or Lack Thereof) Addressing PSV
Even where state law does not criminalize sexual activity between police
officers and those in custody, internal police procedures could provide an
alternative form of regulation, offering potentially milder sanctions while still
expressing an internal norm against such behavior. Unfortunately, as with
135. MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES §§ 213.4(1)(b)(i)–(ii)
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016).
136. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g.., State v. Felton, 339 So. 2d 797, 799, 801 (La. 1976) (holding a police officer
accountable for extortion when he forced a woman to have sexual intercourse with him by threatening
to arrest her).
139. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 116, at 82 (“[C]onsent to sex is not obtained when it
is induced by fears and pressures stemming from sexual abuse of power.”).
140. For a similar argument in a different context, see Leigh Goodmark’s criticism of domestic
violence mandatory arrest policies as prioritizing “safety and accountability over autonomy.” Leigh
Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic
Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
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statutes prohibiting such behavior, most police departments do not have official
policies regarding sexual activity with civilians.
While there is no recent data detailing precisely how many police
departments across the United States have such policies, several reports in recent
years detailed a lack of police department policies addressing PSV. 141 In 2017,
for example, Andrea J. Ritchie and Delores Jones-Brown examined the policies
of thirty-six police departments across the country, including a majority of the
nation’s top thirty law enforcement agencies.142 Their research revealed that
“[a]lthough departments generally had a policy explicitly prohibiting sexual
harassment and misconduct among employees, more than half had no policy
explicitly prohibiting [PSM] against members of the public.”143
Ritchie and Brown’s research also compared several police department
policies regarding PSV. Some policies were extremely detailed, but most were
vague or not sufficiently descriptive.144 For example, Montgomery County,
Maryland’s police department policy prohibited PSV under the larger umbrella
of sexual harassment, stating that “[c]ounty employees must not subject other
employees, contractors, consultants, citizens, applicants, customers, or clients to
sexual harassment. An employee found to have engaged in sexual harassment
will be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, which may include
dismissal.”145 The policy then defined sexual harassment as:
[R]equests for sexual favors; the use of threats or force to obtain sexual
favors; sexual propositions or innuendo; suggestive comments; sexually
oriented teasing or joking; jokes about gender-specific traits;
unwelcome or uninvited touching, patting, pinching, or brushing against
another’s body; obscene spoken or written language; obscene gestures,
and display of offensive or obscene printed or visual material.146
This policy encompasses a wide range of PSV. It does not, however,
acknowledge PSV as a specific form of harm or discuss the imbalanced power
relationship between police officer and civilian that would negate expressed
consent.
Nonetheless, the level of detail of prohibited conduct in Montgomery
County’s policy is arguably better than even shorter examples such as
Washington, D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department, which states only that
“[o]fficers shall . . . [n]ot conduct themselves in an immoral, indecent, lewd, or

141. See e.g., Timothy M. Maher, Police Sexual Misconduct: Officers’ Perceptions of Its Extent
and Causality, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 355, 377 (2003) (“No agency represented in this sample had a
formal written policy on PSM.”).
142. See Andrea J. Ritchie & Delores Jones-Brown, Policing Race, Gender, and Sex: A Review
of Law Enforcement Policies, 27 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (2017). The nation’s top thirty law
enforcement agencies were determined by looking at the number of officers on the force. Id.
143. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
144. See id. at 34–36.
145. Id. at 34.
146. Id.
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disorderly manner or in [sic] manner which might be construed by an observer
as immoral, indecent, lewd, or disorderly.”147 If police department policies are
meant to express an internal norm condemning PSV, such broad edicts are less
helpful. Indeed, at least some police officers who engage in sexual contact with
members of the public likely do not believe they are committing an immoral or
lewd act.
Montgomery County Police Department and Washington, D.C.’s
Metropolitan Police Department have one thing in common: both police
departments actually have a policy discussing PSV. Their existing PSV policies
put them in the minority.148 As Ritchie and Brown’s research revealed, most
police departments in the United States do not have PSV policies at all. 149
Consequently, two major problems arise: (1) there is silence around PSV, which
marginalizes victims of PSV or makes them feel alone in their experience, and
(2) offending police officers are subsequently kept on the job, a process known
as the “officer shuffle,” which puts more people in danger.150
First, the lack of police department policies defining PSV has led to a lack
of uniformity in what the behavior truly constitutes.151 Prior studies suggest that
when a victim of a crime does not know how that crime is characterized, they
are more likely to feel alone and as if they are the only victim. 152 Equally
troubling is the contrast in treatment of different types of police misconduct:
“excessive use of force” is defined and regulated by nearly all police
departments, yet PSV is not.153 Treating PSV differently than other misconduct

147. Id. at 35.
148. See id. at 33
149. See id. (“The majority of departments have no policies or training in place explicitly
addressing [PSV].”).
150. See ANDREA RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN
AND WOMEN OF COLOR 121 (2017) [hereinafter RITCHIE, INVISIBLE].]
151. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 170 (“Structural barriers and vague descriptions are not
the only factors that render [PSM] a hidden phenomenon; much of the difficulty in studying this problem
stems from a lack of convention of what constitutes officer-involved sexual misconduct.”).
152. See RITCHIE, INVISIBLE supra note 150, at 105 (detailing a story about a woman in a postKatrina New Orleans workshop who never told anyone about her PSV story until that workshop—
fourteen years after the assault—because she said she had never “heard anyone talk about sexual
violence as part of the fabric of police violence, or about police as perpetrators of sexual violence”); see
also Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape-Adjacent”: Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsensual Condom
Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 183, 184 (2017) (explaining that stealthing victims did not know
how to describe their stealthing experience because the sexual violence did not have a specific name);
Jenavieve Hatch, Victims of Stealthing Open Up About Why It’s So Damaging, HUFFPOST (May 5,
2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/victims-of-stealthing-open-up-about-why-its-sodamaging_us_59134ad1e4b0a58297e1ad88 [https://perma.cc/HN48-37FB] (quoting a stealthing
survivor that stated “I was such a silly young girl at the time [of my stealthing experience], I really put
all the blame on myself for making a terrible choice in a partner. Now that I have read a few articles on
the apparent frequency of this happening to women, I think my mind is changing a bit”).
153. See The Project, POLICE USE OF FORCE PROJECT, http://useofforceproject.org/#review
[https://perma.cc/6MHJ-JZ26] (explaining that most police departments have use of force policies even
though most policies lack basic protections).
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such as “police brutality” and “excessive use of force” obscures that PSV is a
natural extension of societal sexual violence.154
The silence surrounding PSV also helps to distort the prevalence of the
offense. In her famous book, Invisible No More, Ritchie poses an interesting
question: “What is the first image that comes to your mind when I say police
brutality?”155 The question is answered almost exactly the same way every time
she asks it—“a [W]hite cop beating a Black man (almost always imagined as
heterosexual and cisgender) with a baton.”156 Hardly ever, Ritchie reports, has
the response been sexual violence. If it ever comes up, people usually discuss
Abner Louima’s case.157 The phrase “police brutality” almost never incites
thoughts or discussions about women of color being sexually abused, harassed,
or violated by police.158 Ritchie speculated that the absence of women of color
in discussions of police brutality may be “merely one strand in a seamless web
of daily gendered/racialized assaults by both state and private actors, unworthy
of the focused attention commanded by police brutality against men of color
perceived as a ‘direct’ form of state violence.”159
As discussion progresses, even more of a paradox emerges. An initial
inquiry about police brutality almost never brings PSV to mind. Once Ritchie
frames PSV as a form of “police brutality,” however, she reports that at least one
person has a PSV experience to share, usually one that has never been shared
with anyone before.160 Ritchie’s experiences highlight that once PSV is given a
uniform definition and a national platform by police departments nationwide,
victims will be more likely to talk about their experiences with PSV rather than
conceal their trauma.161
A second major consequence of inconsistent or absent police department
policies is that minimizing discipline allows officers to offend again.
Commentators have frequently criticized a practice known as the “officer
shuffle,” where a police officer found guilty of misconduct is sent to another
jurisdiction rather than dismissed from the police force entirely. 162 Police officers
154. See RITCHIE, INVISIBLE, supra note 150, at 104; see also Andrea J. Ritchie, Law
Enforcement Violence Against Women of Color, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY
138, 139 (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence eds., 2006) [hereinafter Ritchie, Law
Enforcement].
155. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE, supra note 150, at 104.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Ritchie, Law Enforcement, supra note 154, at 141.
160. See RITCHIE, INVISIBLE, supra note 150, at 104–05 (detailing her experience during a
workshop where she framed PSV as a police brutality issue and “a middle-aged Black woman stood up
and told the group that she had been raped by a cop when she was fourteen years old but before that very
moment had never spoken to anyone about it”).
161. See id.
162. See Cara E. Rabe-Hemp & Jeremy Braithwaite, An Exploration of Recidivism and the
Officer Shuffle in Police Sexual Violence, 16 POLICE Q. 127, 137–38, 140–41 (2012) (noting that repeat
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suspected of misconduct are allowed to resign rather than face discipline, then
given recommendations or references to assist them in securing employment in
another department.163
The officer shuffle occurs (and is criticized) for many types of misconduct,
but it can be particularly problematic in the context of PSV as studies show that
sexual offenders tend to commit their crimes over and over.164 In general, sexual
crimes have a high recidivism rate.165 For example, one study found that in the
general population (not solely police officers), offenders who were not caught
and prosecuted averaged more than five rapes.166 Data indicates that this holds
true for police officers who commit sexual violence: one study found that
approximately 40 percent of the analyzed incidents of PSV were committed by
an officer with at least one prior incident of PSV.167 In the context of PSV, the
officer shuffle only works to perpetuate more sexual violence against citizens.
The officer shuffle and the silence surrounding PSV present significant
dangers for both victims and citizens in general. The lack of effective policies,
or any policies at all, addressing PSV almost inevitably sends a message to police
officers: sexual violence against a civilian in your custody may not be a crime,
but even if it is, you will get away with it and even if you do not, you can simply
transfer to another department and commit sexual assault once again. 168
It is a bare minimum first step to make legally explicit that a civilian in
police custody cannot consent to any sexual activity with a police officer. This
formal legal change, however, is not enough. As the next Section will
demonstrate, the systemic problem of PSV arises out of a culture of police selfprotection and hegemonic masculinity that will not be adequately addressed by
a single change in the formal definition of consent and sexual assault in the
context of police custody.

offender officers were more likely to have previously worked at another police station); see also
Trombadore, supra note 20, at 167 (“Officer shuffle occurs when discredited officers move between
departments despite allegations of misconduct.”).
163. See Rabe-Hemp & Braithwaite, supra note 162, at 141.
164. See RITCHIE, INVISIBLE, supra note 150, at 124 (expressing concern over the practice
whereby a police office is caught committing PSV and is simply transferred to another jurisdiction).
165. See Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, DARKNESS TO LIGHT, https://www.d2l.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/all_statistics_20150619.pdf [https://perma.cc/86G2-Z4ST] (“Released rapists
were found to be 10.5 times as likely as non-rapists to be re-arrested for rape.”).
166. See 2 SEXUAL VIOLENCE & ABUSE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PREVENTION, IMPACTS, AND
RECOVERY 706 (Judy L. Postmus ed., 2013). (“Undetected rapists tend to be repeat offenders with one
study reporting an average of more than five rapes for offenders who never were prosecuted by the
criminal justice system.”).
167. See Rabe-Hemp & Braithwaite, supra note 162, at 136.
168. See SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 166 (“[W]hen rapists are undetected[,] they skirt legal
responsibility for their actions and any punishment that may have been handed down by the judicial
system.”).
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II.
PSV, “BOYS WILL BE BOYS,” AND THE BLUE WALL
As discussed above, some of the most challenging aspects of addressing
PSV arise from how broadly PSV occurs and is tolerated, or at least ignored, by
other police officers. PSV is not a problem of a few bad actors in the police.169
Instead, it is symptomatic of a broader cultural problem of how sexual violence
and sexual coercion are viewed by police officers. Any comprehensive account
of PSV must address this cultural problem directly.
One of the deepest running cultural tropes, reaching far beyond police
officers, is the well-trod phrase “boys will be boys”—used to excuse all sorts of
inappropriate and even criminal behavior.170 “Boys will be boys” is a harmful
concept not simply because it excuses individual instances of bad behavior, but
because it summarizes a belief that “boys are, by nature, disruptive, aggressive,
unwise, and predatory.”171 This expression not only reinforces gender
stereotypes (namely that men are masculine and aggressive) but also presumes
that all men cannot control their destructive or aggressive behaviors.172 Such
stereotypes are examined and helpfully explained by the concept of hegemonic
masculinity.
A. Hegemonic Masculinity
The field of masculinities interrogates what expectations American society
and law express about who men and boys are supposed to be. The field is
generally labeled “masculinities” to indicate that there are different kinds of
masculinity embodied by individual people.173 A key concept that directly
challenges the myriad types of masculinities, however, is hegemonic
masculinity: a single vision of masculinity that is seen as correct. This type of
masculinity is described as the “ideal masculinity that has the most power at any

169. See Thomas Barker, Peer Group Support for Police Occupational Deviance, 15
CRIMINOLOGY 353, 354 (1977) (finding “little support” for the “myth of the rotten apple”); Timothy M.
Maher, Police Chiefs’ Views on Police Sexual Misconduct, 9 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 239, 239–40 (2008)
(describing the “‘bad apple’ theory of police corruption” as “subject to much criticism in recent years”).
170. See Megan Garber, Brett Kavanaugh and the Revealing Logic of ‘Boys Will Be Boys’,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/09/brettkavanaugh-and-the-revealing-logic-of-boys-will-be-boys/570415/ [https://perma.cc/XGK3-SJ9R].
171. Rachel Brandt, 4 Ways the ‘Boys Will Be Boys’ Attitude Harms the Men in Our Lives,
EVERYDAY FEMINISM (May 27, 2016), https://everydayfeminism.com/2016/05/boys-will-be-boysharm/ [https://perma.cc/T2UQ-JA9Z].
172. See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Identities Cubed: Perspectives on
Multidimensional Masculinities Theory, 13 NEV. L.J. 326, 336–37 (2013) (explaining that the phrase
“boys will be boys” excuses a man’s excessively aggressive or destructive behaviors based on their
biology rather than their social constructs and surroundings) [hereinafter McGinley & Cooper, Identities
Cubed].
173. See Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards A New Framework
for Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 431, 441 (2010); John M. Kang,
The Burdens of Manliness, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 477, 495–507 (2010).
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given time and place.”174 Hegemonic masculinity places itself firmly on top of a
hierarchy, establishing the best and arguably only way to truly be a man. 175 As
Ann McGinley and Frank Rudy Cooper—two of the leading scholars in legal
masculinities—have summarized, even though “the hegemony of men”
acknowledges that on the whole American society is patriarchal, hegemonic
masculinity recognizes the simultaneous “harm that socially constructed
masculinity does to men.”176
As implied by hegemonic masculinity’s characterization as the only one
way to be a man, its definition is extremely narrow. Hegemonic masculinity
“focuses on competition, aggression, independence, control, and capacity for
violence.”177 Because masculinity is also intersectional, hegemonic masculinity
usually describes “the upper middle class [W]hite male professional who
represents the ideal version of masculinity because of the important relationship
between masculinity and breadwinning.”178 Hegemonic masculinity is thus
raced, classed, and heteronormative as well as gendered.
This specific form of hegemonic masculinity obviously leaves out the
majority of men. Additionally, hegemonic masculinity is fundamentally
unstable: it is not a status, but a very temporary result of a successful
performance of masculinity.179 Cooper describes hegemonic masculinity as both
homosocial, meaning that the performances are for the benefit of other men, and
anxious “that other men will unmask them as insufficiently manly.”180
Because of the pressure of attaining and re-attaining the narrow definition
of hegemonic masculinity, as well as the intersectional dimensions that place
many men further away from satisfying hegemonic masculinity’s narrow
strictures, many men feel as though reaching hegemonic masculinity is an
impossible task.181 To prove their masculinity, these men tend to act in more
physical, hypermasculine ways.182
Hypermasculinity is thus overcompensation. Denied the status of
hegemonic masculinity for one reason, a man engages in hypermasculine
174. Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L.J. 221, 238 (2015)
[hereinafter McGinley, Policing].
175. See Frank R. Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police
Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 686 (2009) [hereinafter Cooper, Who’s the Man].
176. McGinley & Cooper, Identities Cubed, supra note 172, at 332; see also Nancy E. Dowd,
Asking the Man Question: Masculinities Analysis and Feminist Theory, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 415,
418 (2010) [hereinafter Dowd, Asking the Man Question].
177. McGinley, Policing, supra note 174.
178. Id.
179. See Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. Destefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 581, 586 (2010).
180. Cooper, Who’s the Man, supra note 175, at 688; see also Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities,
Post-Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11
NEV. L.J. 1, 18 (2010) [hereinafter Cooper, Masculinities]; Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist
Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 201, 210 (2008).
181. See McGinley, Policing, supra note 174, at 239.
182. See id.
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performance to try to make up the difference.183 Engaging in hypermasculine
performance is, as Cooper put it, “an attempt to regain social status.” 184
Hypermasculine performances often depend upon asserting one’s dominance
over people seen as “lesser” according to the strictures of hegemonic
masculinity.185 Such performances include bragging about the sexual conquest
of women and using physical aggression against people seen as weaker.186
Violence can be a key part of hypermasculine performances, particularly against
people seen as potential threats to one’s masculinity.187 Performances of
hypermasculinity in attempts to impress or intimidate other men thus become
part of the competition of hegemonic masculinity.188
B. Police Culture and Masculinities
Many of the more negative aspects of police culture are an example of such
hypermasculine performances. In one of the foundational articles analyzing the
police through a masculinities lens, Angela Harris contrasted the
hypermasculinity of police with that of violent criminals:
The cultural image of a police officer is a uniquely valuable and rare
kind of man: tough and violent, yet heroic, protective, and necessary to
society’s very survival. In a sense, the police officer is expected to be
the mirror image of the paradigmatic criminal, the violent thug who
threatens the lives and safety of innocent citizens. Criminals use
violence in the service of evil; cops use violence to overcome evil.189
Police officers thus engage in the violence of hypermasculinity, but in a
socially (and legally) acceptable way, justifying it as protection rather than
danger. The job depends upon physical achievements and trust between police
officers, “especially when they are in the wrong.”190
Police officers also come from communities that may be more likely to feel
the need to engage in hypermasculine performances. One reason that a man fails
to reach the top status of hegemonic masculinity is that he is not of sufficiently
high socioeconomic class.191 Although being a police officer is itself a status

183. See Cooper, Who’s the Man, supra note 175, at 691.
184. Id.; see also Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 777, 785 (2000).
185. See id.
186. See Cooper, Who’s the Man, supra note 175, at 691.
187. See Harris, supra note 184, at 781.
188. See Cooper, Who’s the Man, supra note 175, at 688.
189. See Harris, supra note 184, at 793.
190. Leigh Goodmark, Hands Up at Home: Militarized Masculinity and Police Officers Who
Commit Intimate Partner Abuse, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1183, 1210 (2015).
191. See McGinley, supra note 179, at 601 (“Firefighters also engage in subversive masculinities
which highlight the firefighters' class-related attitudes toward other men. In particular, firefighters
demean white collar men by disrespecting them. While the men in white collar jobs are more powerful
economically, male firefighters gain their own power by questioning the masculinity of the male white
collar workers and demonstrating their own superior strength.”); Harris, supra note 184, at 783–84.
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boost of masculinity, the ranks of police officers disproportionately draw from
lower socioeconomic statuses and the occupation of police officer is often
considered a blue collar job.192 The employment base of the police is thus
dominated by men who are most likely to feel that they must engage in
hypermasculinity to assert their status.
Although police departments have increased the number of women officers
in recent decades, they are still dominated by men.193 Police department cultures
have problematic attitudes toward women that are consistent with hegemonic
masculinity.194 Police departments have faced repeated issues with sexual
harassment of female police officers by their coworkers195 as well as domestic
violence committed against girlfriends and wives at home. 196 The culture of
police training uses female students in police academies as foils to define even
more clearly in-groups of men and out-groups of everyone else.197 Police officers
are also more likely than members of the public to believe problematic
stereotypes about female victims of sexual assault. As Cory Rayburn Yung has
detailed, “seventy-nine percent agree that ‘many women secretly wish to be
raped’ and sixty-five percent agree that women with ‘bad reputations’ make the
most rape complaints.”198
Police officers and police departments then build a culture of support and
silence on top of a foundation of hegemonic masculinity and hypermasculine
performance. Scholars have described police departments as “closed groups”
that develop their own unwritten rules of behavior.199 One of the most infamous
examples is the notorious “blue wall of silence.”200 The blue wall is an unwritten
police code of silence that demands that police officers remain silent or even
affirmatively lie to conceal misconduct by a fellow officer. 201 The blue wall,
which “spawns a strong loyalty on the part of police officers to each other,”202 is
believed to have developed as a result of the danger and hierarchical authority to

192. See Harris, supra note 184, at 794.
193. Cf. Dowd, Asking the Man Question, supra note 176, at 422 (describing masculinities as an
attempt to “see gender where it is obvious, and to notice the difference between how gender operates in
homosocial or male-exclusive or male-dominant environments, as compared to how gender functions
in mixed gender environments”).
194. See Goodmark, supra note 190, at 1212.
195. See Harris, supra note 184, at 795–96.
196. See Goodmark, supra note 190, at 1189–95.
197. See Anastasia Prokos & Irene Padavic, ‘There Oughtta Be a Law Against Bitches’:
Masculinity Lessons in Police Academy Training, 9 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 439, 441 (2002).
198. Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, 58 B.C. L. REV. 205, 210 (2017)
199. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 250 (1998).
200. Id. at 237 (defining the “blue wall of silence” as “an unwritten code in many departments
which prohibits disclosing perjury or other misconduct by fellow officers, or even testifying truthfully
if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow officer”).
201. See id.
202. Id. at 252.
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which police officers are subjected. 203 Police officers face very serious physical
danger in the line of duty, and trust between fellow officers takes on greater
significance (and greater consequences) than almost any other coworking
relationship.
William Westley’s famous research published in the 1950s describes how
secrecy “functions as a social bond among the police, by giving them something
in common (if only a sense of mutual incrimination).”204 Additionally, police
officers operate within a system of clearly delineated ranks, and obeying orders
issued by higher ranking officers is a similarly essential component of
maintaining safety amidst potentially dangerous activities. It is thus unsurprising
that police officers develop such strong loyalties to fellow officers.205 Scholars
note that the blue wall may also be a result of pressures on police officers from
the public and the media not only to provide protection to the community but
also to remain honest and trustworthy.206
While loyalty to one’s coworkers is obviously not in and of itself corrupt,
the nature of police work creates a unique type of group loyalty whereby police
officers are mandated to maintain their allegiance even to corrupt police
officers.207 This unwavering commitment to loyalty has harsh consequences.
Police officers that breach the blue wall may be “ostracized and harassed[,]
become targets of complaints and even physical threats[,] and are made to fear
that they will be left alone on the streets in a time of crisis.” 208 Fearing these
consequences, police officers tend to overlook peer misconduct or even lie about
it.209 Even a generally honest police officer may feel pressured to maintain
silence “in the face of another’s misconduct.”210 Some police officers have
indicated that they are more reluctant to report a police officer than a regular
citizen because they “do not want to be responsible for getting a fellow cop in
trouble.”211 Therefore, especially in cases alleging use of excessive force or

203.
204.
205.

Id. at 237
William A. Westley, Secrecy and the Police, 23 SOC. FORCES 254, 256 (1956).
See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 92 (1993).
206. Chin & Wells, supra note 199, at 251.
207. Id. at 252–53; see also Westley, supra note 204 (“Secrecy stands as a shield against the
attacks of the outside world; against bad newspaper publicity which would lower the reputation of the
police; against public criticism from which the police feel that they suffer too much; against the criminal
who is eager to know the moves of the police; against the law which the police all too frequently
abrogate.”).
208. Chin & Wells, supra note 199, at 254; see also Maher, supra note 141, at 371 (“[I]t could
mean suffering the consequences of sanctions by police coworkers.”).
209. Chin & Wells, supra note 199, at 254.
210. Id. at 251.
211. Maher, supra note 141, at 376.
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police brutality, police officers often come together to either conceal or justify a
fellow officer’s wrongful conduct.212
Additionally, the close bonds between police officers reinforce the
vulnerability that can trigger hypermasculine performances. Two central
commandments of hegemonic masculinity are not to be a woman and not to be
gay.213 The close relationships between police officers, both emotional and
physical, could easily be viewed as becoming romantic or even sexual. 214 The
trust and reliance among male police officers thus pushes them towards a
perceived need to counter implications of being gay with hypermasculinity.
The blue wall also contributes to a relativist moral code that does not
perceive incidents of PSV as morally wrong. In September 2008, researcher and
former police officer Timothy Maher interviewed police chiefs in fourteen
different police agencies located in the St. Louis metropolitan area about their
perceptions regarding the nature, extent, and causes of PSV. 215 Maher
determined that four factors were particularly influential in allowing PSV: police
culture, police departments’ policies addressing PSV, opportunity for sexual
violence, and lack of knowledge about PSV. 216 Maher concluded that police
culture, including the blue wall, creates an atmosphere of ethical relativism. 217
Ethical relativism is a theory that suggests that morality is determined by
“cultural traditions and socialization” rather than objective moral truths.218 In
other words, one determines what is ethical and moral based on their social and
cultural surroundings.219 Police officers thus create an understanding of morality
and ethics as determined by police culture, which has deep roots in hegemonic
masculinity.
The blue wall theory helps explain why some police officers conclude that
PSV is not a moral or ethical failing that is worthy of attention. Maher’s research
concluded that 36.5 percent of police officers in the study have committed some
form of PSV.220 This finding is staggering. It contradicts any notion that PSV is

212. See id. Notably, a study conducted by the International Association of Police Chiefs, which
surveyed hundreds of police officers in twenty-one states, revealed that almost half of the officers stated
that “the code [of silence] was strongest when excessive force was used.” See Earl Ofari Hutchinson,
It’s Time for Cops to Break the Blue Code of Silence, HUFFPOST (Sept. 24, 2016),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/earl-ofari-hutchinson/its-time-for-cops-to-brea_b_12173778.html
[https://perma.cc/4KQK-KZTY]. For an in-depth discussion about the blue wall of silence and police
perjury, see Chin & Wells, supra note 199.
213. See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the
Construction of Gender Identity, in TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER, 223, 229-31, 232-35
(Mary M. Gergen & Sara N. Davis eds., 1997); see also Dara E. Purvis, Trump, Gender Rebels, and
Masculinities, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 423, 429–31 (2019).
214. See Harris, supra note 184, at 787–88.
215. Maher, supra note 141, at 355.
216. See id. at 376–78.
217. Id. at 375.
218. Id. at 376.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 367.
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committed by a few bad actors and demonstrates not only the severity and
widespread nature of PSV but also that police officers fail to grasp how
widespread the offense is.221 The prevalence of PSV coupled with the theory of
ethical relativism suggests that PSV is a behavior police officers have simply
been conditioned to accept.222
The blue wall coupled with the theory of ethical relativism allows police
departments to keep PSV under wraps. During Maher’s study, one officer
reportedly stated, “Everybody knows [PSM] goes on, but nobody makes a big
deal. Not until some citizen reports it, or the media gets a hold of it will PSM
become a hot issue.”223
Moreover, hegemonic masculinity helps explain why police officers often
target people in the criminalized margins of society.224 Police officers looking to
establish their masculinity will assert dominance over individuals lower in the
identity hierarchy or individuals who are particularly vulnerable to the criminal
justice system.225 Victims of PSV often include drug addicts, sex workers,
LGBTQ+ people, and—disproportionately so—women of color.226 Notably, all
of these groups occupy a lower level on the identity hierarchy of hegemonic
masculinity than a police officer does.227 Unsurprisingly then, hypermasculine
police officers are more likely to sexually assault members of these vulnerable
groups in order to assert their dominance and establish their masculinity. 228
Finally, hegemonic masculinity helps explain the fraught relationship that
police officers often have with the community in which they serve. Many
scholars have written about the epidemic of police violence against Black men
and communities, a phenomenon Devon Carbado has called “blue-on-[B]lack
violence.”229 Although some of the cause certainly traces back to white
supremacy, masculinity, and a broader sense of “us versus them” also contribute.
Ann McGinley described police killings of Black men, largely by White officers,
as gendered violence. As she describes it, hypermasculine police officers must
dominate civilians in their patrol areas, and violence inflicted on those civilians
is one of the most effective ways to achieve that masculine dominance.230
221. Id. at 370.
222. Id. at 371 (“Although peer pressure to actively engage in PSM may be perceived as low, the
police culture may create an atmosphere in which officers are conditioned to be apathetic toward PSM,
even if they themselves do not participate.”).
223. Id. at 373.
224. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 165–67 (explaining that offending police prey on
“vulnerable” communities that are unlikely to be believed if they try to press charges against the police
for sexual assault).
225. See Cooper, Who’s the Man, supra note 175, at 689.
226. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 168.
227. See Cooper, Who’s the Man, supra note 175, at 691–92.
228. See id. at 692 (“We might say that such hypermasculine behaviors are both a product of the
existence of a normative masculinity and themselves a dominant way in which working-class men seek
to establish their masculinity.”).
229. Carbado, supra note 27, at 1480–81.
230. See McGinley, Policing, supra note 177, at 244.
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Cooper has a specific term for individual conflicts between a police officer
and a member of the public: masculinity contests. A masculinity contest begins
with Cooper’s concept of the “command presence” of police officers projecting
an “aura of confidence.”231 The flip side of the command presence of police
officers is the expectation that civilians defer to police officers, showing respect
for their greater authority.232 A masculinity contest, just as it sounds, is when two
men attempt to assert their masculine power over the other, each attempting to
prove his greater masculine status.233 In interactions between police and
members of the public, masculinity contests can arise when a police officer
deploys his command presence for no reason or if a member of the public does
not show what the police officer considers to be appropriate deference.234
Cooper argued that stop-and-frisk interactions, known as Terry stops, are
opportunities for police officers to stage and win a masculinity contest as they
deploy both individual and institutional power to demand obedience from a
civilian.235 A recent article echoed Cooper’s argument, revisiting the impact of
Terry stops in the era of #MeToo and examining the often sexualized nature of
frisks.236 Cooper has also written of the peril of a masculinity challenge when
one’s masculinity is threatened by a specific challenge or an inability to
adequately perform masculinity.237 Cooper argued that masculinity challenges
can be sparked by compensatory subordination: a man who lacks status in one
characteristic finds another characteristic through which he can engage in a
masculinity contest to prove his superiority. This may occur, for example, when
a police officer with low socioeconomic status uses the power of his employment
to dominate another man.238
Importantly, Cooper’s reading of interactions between police officers and
the public implies how and why police officers could inflict PSV as a masculinity
contest. One implication has to do with the dominance of the individual victim,
a masculinity contest won through sexual conquest. Moreover, if the unwritten
rule of civilian interactions with police is that the civilian must defer to the police
officer, then this unwritten rule underscores that any purported expressed consent
granted by a member of the public could not be meaningful consent.
A broader implication, however, concerns the larger community. A
successful hegemonic man accrues possessions—as Cooper puts it, “The indicia
of manhood—money, power, women, and so on—are scarce resources; you can

231. Cooper, Who’s the Man, supra note 175, at 694.
232. Cooper, Masculinities, supra note 180, at 19.
233. Id. at 21; see also id. at 23–29 (describing the arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates
at his own home as the product of a masculinity contest).
234. See id. at 19–22.
235. Cooper, Who’s the Man, supra note 175, at 700.
236. See Josephine Ross, What the #MeToo Campaign Teaches About Stop and Frisk, 54 IDAHO
L. REV. 543 (2018).
237. Cooper, Masculinities, supra note 180, at 20.
238. Id. at 21–22.
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always have more, and they gain their value from the fact that other men are
denied them.”239 In masculinity contests between police officers and male
members of the public, female members of the public are possessions that shift
the balance of power in a police officer’s favor if he takes them. In other words,
the sexual domination of women in a community also becomes a mechanism of
expressing masculine dominance over the men of that community. This is
obviously a deeply problematic calculus but one that fits perfectly within the
worldview of hegemonic masculinity.
Masculinities helps to deepen and explain what otherwise seems like
inexplicable behavior by police officers who devote their lives to serving the
public. Police officers are steeped in an environment of hegemonic masculinity,
coding their job as essentially masculine and glorifying methods by which police
officers demonstrate power over members of the public. Police officers therefore
learn to engage in hypermasculine performances such as exerting sexual
dominance and bragging about PSV behavior to their coworkers. 240 Even if
police officers inform their coworkers of this wrongful behavior, offending
officers are rarely reprimanded because of ethical relativism and the blue wall.
The officers’ coworkers are conditioned to feel apathetic towards the wrongful
behavior, and the blue wall dissuades them from reporting it, even if coworkers
understand the severity of the behavior.241 Thus, the blue wall protects offending
officers despite their egregious conduct. Police culture perfectly embodies a
“boys will be boys” attitude, giving male officers a pass to sexually assault
women (and other minority groups) without facing any consequences.242 The
structure of hegemonic masculinity both makes such violence more likely and
prevents police departments from meaningfully addressing it.
III.
A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM DEMANDS SYSTEMIC REFORM
Despite statistics indicating that a police officer engages in PSV every five
days,243 PSV remains a deeply systemic problem that is underreported, underresearched, and underdiscussed. Remaining silent about conduct that both
jeopardizes the integrity of the criminal justice system and endangers women
undermines the work of sexual assault advocates around the world. Therefore, in
Cooper, Who’s the Man, supra note 175, at 688.
See Yoder, supra note 64. In an interview for the online article, Penny Harrington stated:
It’s a minority of officers who do this kind of thing . . . [but] there is this culture in law
enforcement . . . you don’t tell on your buddies, and you become so insular and isolated. You
get so bought into this police culture—this macho, very often sexualized culture—and you
don’t see anything wrong with it. It’s like . . . a badge of honor, how many women in the
community you can have sex with, and the younger the better.

239.
240.

Id.
241. See id.
242. See Maher, supra note 141, at 373 (explaining that one of the police officers interviewed for
the study stated, “Cops are just like all men,” which only serves to perpetuate gender stereotypes).
243. Trombadore, supra note 20, at 160 (citing Spina, supra note 49).
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an effort to expand sexual assault awareness through movements like #MeToo,
PSV must be included in the dialogue surrounding sexual assault.
Simultaneously, PSV should be incorporated into broader discussions of police
brutality as it is one form of violence inflicted on both individuals and entire
communities.
As other scholars have argued, a necessary preliminary step in addressing
PSV is developing a uniform definition of PSV. 244 A uniform definition of PSV
would provide a clear legal standard for courts and law enforcement and would
appropriately label the term for the general public.245 For example, in 1979,
Catharine MacKinnon formally defined workplace harassment as “sexual
harassment.”246 Once the legal term was defined, capturing what had otherwise
seemed like a broad and varied problem, awareness of the problem
skyrocketed.247 In 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act248
after stakeholders began defining and raising awareness of sexual misconduct
between corrections officers and inmates.249 Most recently, in 2016, Alexandra
Brodsky coined the term “stealthing,” a form of sexual assault whereby a man
takes off his condom without his partner’s consent. Once stealthing was openly
discussed, victims recognized the sense of betrayal they harbored was
warranted.250 These examples illustrate that “unity in problem formulation has
the potential to mobilize entire movements.”251
Therefore, to ensure accountability and raise awareness about PSV, a
uniform definition of PSV must be adopted.252 Defining PSV will assist the
public in conceptualizing the behavior and will also set precise boundaries for
police officers and administrators.253 Until the behavior is specifically and
uniformly defined, statistics will not be entirely accurate and awareness of the
problem will be limited to those who actively research PSV. A uniform definition
of PSV will help mobilize a movement that should have begun years ago.254
Merely defining the offense, however, is not enough. PSV is a problem
emerging from deep roots embedded in police policies and culture. A systemic

244. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 163 (“Because scholars and reporters rarely define
[PSM], the various manifestations included in descriptions of this behavior cause confusion among
stakeholders.”).
245. Id. at 175.
246. See id. at 176.
247. Id.
248. 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (2018).
249. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 178–79.
250. See Brodsky, supra note 152, at 183; see also Melissa Marie Blanco, Sex Trend or Sexual
Assault?: The Dangers of “Stealthing” and the Concept of Conditional Consent, 123 PENN ST. L. REV.
217 (2018).
251. Trombadore, supra note 20, at 175.
252. See id. at 170.
253. See Maher, supra note 141, at 377.
254. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 175.
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response is necessary to address the effects, the concealment, and the cultural
roots of PSV.
A. The Substance of PSV: Custody and Consent
About thirty states do not currently have laws prohibiting police officers
from having “consensual” sex with people in their custody. 255 This is an
unacceptable lapse in regulation: it should be legally impossible for a civilian in
custody to consent to sexual contact with a police officer. Establishing a brightline rule forbidding sexual contact between a police officer on duty and a
member of the public must be the first step in addressing PSV.
As an initial matter, it is important to discuss the use of the concept of
custody. As discussed above, state statutes that prohibit PSV generally prohibit
sexual contact between a police officer and a person in police custody. In theory,
“in custody” does not mean that a person has actually been arrested or formally
taken into custody. In Miranda v. Arizona,256 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a person is considered “in custody” not only when they are
physically taken into custody, but also if they are otherwise deprived of freedom
of action in any significant way.257
In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court has held that a person is
not in custody for Miranda purposes even in contexts where most people would
not feel free to leave. For example, the Court has held that routine traffic stops
do not require a Miranda warning.258 This is true even though, as the Court
acknowledged, most states make it a crime to refuse to stop upon a police
officer’s signal or, once stopped, to drive away before the police officer gives
permission.259 The Court reasoned that, in contrast to being individually pulled
over, a routine traffic stop is more akin to a Terry stop, in which a police officer
briefly detains a person who the officer has reasonable suspicion is involved in
the commission of a crime.260 The Court described both stops as “comparatively
nonthreatening . . . detentions,” that did not constitute a person being in custody
for the purpose of a Miranda warning.261
This Miranda analysis intersects with a related question under the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against search and seizure. The Fourth Amendment
requires reasonable suspicion before a person may be seized and searched.262
Even without reasonable suspicion, however, the police are free to search a
person if the person voluntarily consents. In assessing whether a person
255. The variation in counting by different commentators is due to the wide variety in statutory
language, as discussed above. See supra notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text.
256. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
257. Id. at 444.
258. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436–37 (1984).
259. See id. at 436.
260. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1968).
261. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.
262. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1991).
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voluntarily consented to a search or whether the person had already been seized
by the police, the Court posed a similar question: would a reasonable person have
felt free to “terminate the encounter” with the police?263 If so, then they were not
seized and could have told the officer not to search them.
This raises two dilemmas in the context of PSV. The first returns to the idea
of consent. If a police officer asks to search a person, the voluntariness of that
consent is evaluated by considering the totality of the circumstances.264 Consent
may be valid even if the person later says they did not know they could refuse265
or had already been arrested.266
One parallel question in the context of PSV is: if a person can consent to a
search by the police, shouldn’t a person also be able to consent to sexual activity
with the police? The answer is no, not only for the reasons discussed earlier
focusing on the validity of an individual’s consent, but also from the perspective
of the police. The search of a member of the public furthers “the effective
enforcement of criminal laws.”267 Evaluating how protective the Constitution
requires police to be of a civilian’s choice to consent to a search thus balances
an individual’s liberty rights against the whole community’s security.268
By contrast, civil consent to a sexual encounter with a police officer has no
such value. There are almost no circumstances in which police sexual
interactions with civilians are necessary (or even relevant) for a valid law
enforcement purpose.269 A police search of a suspect furthers the core goals of
law enforcement so courts have found an acceptable margin of error allowing
the search even where the civilian claims their consent was not voluntary.
Without any purpose but the sexual gratification of the police officer, there is no
reason why any margin of error should be tolerated.
This reasoning illuminates the second dilemma: do current statutes
focusing on custody go far enough? It is obvious why a person in custody cannot
consent to sexual acts with a police officer. Given that, by definition, a person
“in custody” feels they are not at liberty to even terminate their conversation with
the police officer, purportedly consenting to sexual activities with that same

263. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 195 (2002).
264. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
265. See id. at 231–33.
266. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424–45 (1976).
267. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.
268. See id.
269. The obvious exception is operations investigating sex workers in which police officers
working undercover pose as clients of the sex workers. Although courts have occasionally found that a
police officer’s actions were so outrageous as to violate due process, scholars have criticized tacit
acceptance of at least some sexual interactions in the context of undercover operations. See State v.
Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 375–76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that initiating sexual contact during
a massage was outrageous); Phillip Walters, “Would A Cop Do This?”: Ending the Practice of Sexual
Sampling in Prostitution Stings, 29 LAW & INEQ. 451, 462–65 (2011) (listing examples of sexual contact
between police officers and members of the public that were not found to be outrageous).
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police officer is entirely implausible.270 The bare minimum, therefore, is that a
uniform definition of PSV in all fifty states must incorporate the substantive rule
that a person in police custody is incapable of consenting to sexual activity with
a police officer. New York’s statute, passed in the wake of the Anna Chambers
incident, is a good example of such a law:
A person is deemed incapable of consent when he or she is: . . . (j)
detained or otherwise in the custody of a police officer, peace officer, or
other law enforcement official and the actor is a police officer, peace
officer or other law enforcement official who either: (i) is detaining or
maintaining custody of such person; or (ii) knows, or reasonably should
know, that at the time of the offense, such person was detained or in
custody.271
Even this rule, however, would not reach conduct such as Holtzclaw’s
sexual assault of a seventeen-year-old girl after driving her home.272 Andrea
Ritchie proposed a much broader rule prohibiting sexual activity while a police
officer is on duty, using a police vehicle, or at a state facility.273 Colorado’s
statute takes a similarly broad perspective in its statute defining unlawful sexual
conduct by a peace officer:
(1) A peace officer commits unlawful sexual conduct by a peace officer
by knowingly engaging in sexual contact, sexual intrusion, or sexual
penetration under any of the following circumstances:
(a) In the same encounter, the peace officer contacts the victim for
the purpose of law enforcement or contacts the victim in the
exercise of the officer's employment activities or duties;
(b) The peace officer knows that the victim is, or causes the victim
to believe that he or she is, the subject of an active investigation,
and the peace officer uses that knowledge to further the sexual
contact, intrusion, or penetration; or
(c) In furtherance of sexual contact, intrusion, or penetration, the
peace officer makes any show of real or apparent authority.274
This Article focused on sexual contact with a person in custody because the
legislative gap seems so obviously deficient, particularly in contrast with formal
prohibitions of sexual contact between corrections officers and people in prison.
It is our opinion, however, that the broader approach, used by Colorado and
proposed by Andrea Ritchie, focusing on use of a police officer’s authority is a
better approach. As discussed above, there is no legitimate reason why a police
officer would use the power of their badge to engage in sexual contact with a
member of the public. A clear prohibition of such coercion would be ideal, while
270.
271.
272.
273.

See Bodde & Lorshbough, supra note 85.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(j)(i)–(iii) (2019).
See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text.
JAMES E. COPPLE & PATRICIA M. DUNN, GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND 21ST CENTURY
POLICING: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE LGBTQ+ COMMUNITY 46–55 (2017).
274. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-405.7(1)(a)–(c) (2019)
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the more common approach of prohibiting sexual contact with individuals in
custody would be a second-best option.
B. Formalities of Fighting PSV
A clear external rule will often not be enough to tackle PSV. In addition to
the uniform substantive rule, clearer formal procedures should implement the
rule within police departments and the larger community.275 Scholars indicate
that police administrators play a crucial role in modifying police officer
behavior.276 External rules of liability, even criminal liability, will not be enough.
Given the “apparent availability of opportunities for misconduct provided by
police work,” police administrators are in a unique position to proactively control
PSV. 277 Furthermore, because of the ethical relativism operating within police
departments, administrators must condition officers to recognize the
dangerousness and severity of PSV.278
In order to most effectively dismantle PSV from the inside, administrators
“should be educated and trained about sexual [violence] and its effects on
policing.”279 Understanding some of the likely reasons PSV is prominent will
allow police department administrators to create more effective policies
grounded in research. Additionally, knowledge about PSV will allow police
department administrators to communicate and emphasize that all PSV is
problematic, not just the most severe forms.280 Finally, police department
administrators are in the best position to advocate for the integrity of the criminal
justice system, which is strongly undermined by PSV.281 Once “the secrecy
surrounding PSM is removed, and police administrators, supervisors, and
officers take this problem seriously, it is likely that the true extent of PSM will
be discovered and legitimate efforts can be made to control it.”282 Until then,
however, the blue wall will continue protecting offending officers who abuse
their authority by preying on the most vulnerable.
A key component of this administrative change is the need for police
departments to adopt written policies defining and prohibiting PSV. The lack of
written policies addressing PSV “may suggest that police officials believe that
PSM is not a significant problem and therefore is not worthy of a policy.”283
Implementing formal policies addressing PSV may be instrumental in
dismantling this behavior within police departments. At minimum, specific,

275. See Yung, supra note 198, at 239.
276. See Maher, supra note 141, at 378.
277. Id.
278. See supra notes 217–219 and accompanying text.
279. See Maher, supra note 141, at 377.
280. See id. at 377.
281. See id. at 355 (“[PSM] compromises the integrity of the law enforcement community and
interferes with police officers’ ability to effectively perform their duties.”).
282. Id. at 377.
283. Id. at 378.
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formal policies can clearly define what is expected of police officers and what is
considered inappropriate conduct. Internal guidance from within the department
will directly combat the ethical relativist perception that PSV is acceptable (or at
least not worth reporting).284 In this way, police department policies can serve
an expressive function: detailing explicit expectations which may serve both “to
provide a voice in which citizens may speak and alter the behavior of people the
[policies] address.”285 Policies addressing PSV would therefore “send a message
to police officers and the public that this behavior is not condoned or
tolerated.”286 Written policies addressing PSV may be a crucial tool for
controlling police behavior,287 which is crucial given the severity and prevalence
of PSV and the strength of the blue wall.
Research into other examples of police misconduct further substantiates the
effectiveness of written policies. The Use of Force Project conducted research
on police departments with “use of force” policies, investigating whether there
was a relationship between use of force policies and the prevalence of police
killings.288 Their research revealed that police departments with use of force
policies had fewer killings per population and per arrest than those without.289
The advocates determined that “a police department with no . . . policies
currently in place would have 72 [percent] fewer killings by implementing all . . .
of these policies.”290 The advocates concluded their research by stating:
This [research] suggests that advocacy efforts pushing police
department[s] to adopt more restrictive use of force policies—and the
accountability structures to enforce them—can substantially reduce the
number of people killed by police in America. And while this analysis
was limited to examining rates of deadly force, these policies may also
be associated with reductions in other forms of police violence as
well.291
Although the Use of Force Project relates only to use of deadly force, the
research suggests that police department policies can be highly influential in
controlling police behavior.292 Accordingly, all police departments in the United
284. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function of Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495,
498 (1992).
285. Id.; see also ROBERT BELLAH, ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 10 (2011) (explaining that laws
have the ability to create societal expectations by enforcing positive and negative sanctions).
286. Maher, supra note 141, at 377.
287. Id. (“Some research suggests that policies help establish uniformity in policing and create a
formal framework for controlling police behavior.”).
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. See The Project, POLICE USE OF FORCE PROJECT, supra note 153.
291. Id.
292. It is of course possible that correlation is not causation and the presence of use of force
policies reflects the culture of police departments that were already taking other measures to reduce the
number of police-involved killings. The Use of Force Project acknowledges this limitation and calls for
future research into causation but nonetheless concludes that the impact of use of force policies is clear
enough to justify promoting adoption of such protections. See id.
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States should create and enforce policies addressing PSV to reduce the amount
of people assaulted by police. To be most effective, the policies must expressly
prohibit the “officer shuffle.” Without a stipulation in the policies prohibiting the
“officer shuffle,” the policies will be lackluster and police officers will not take
them seriously.293
Additionally, states and police departments should establish a clear method
for members of the public to report misconduct by police, including PSV. Every
state should institute a civilian complaint department similar to New York’s
Civilian Complaint Review Board. PSV victims are typically fearful of
retaliation by the assaulting officer and often do not know where to report police
misconduct. Creating a civilian complaint department where civilians can press
charges against officers will alleviate that fear and ensure that victims do not
suffer in silence simply because they are unsure of where to report. Creating and
enforcing written policies addressing PSV will set a standard of intolerance of
PSV within police departments which may in turn reduce the occurrence of PSV.
Additionally, establishing separate entities to review and address PSV cases (and
other forms of police violence) will ensure that police conduct is reviewed and
that police authority is not abused. Thus, creating a separate entity to take care
of police officer complaints will ensure that police officers and police
departments are not “[l]eft unchecked.”294
C. Fighting the Culture of PSV
Substantive and procedural changes within the law and police departments,
however, are not enough. PSV is symptomatic of a broader cultural problem
combining police brutality, hegemonic masculinity, and broader tensions
implicating race, class, and other identities. Any attempt to meaningfully combat
PSV must take these deeper roots into account.
1. Call It What It Is: PSV Is a Form of Police Brutality
If police brutality can take the form of sexual abuse, do our laws, police
department policies, and media carve out a conceptual difference between
traditional police brutality and PSV? It is unquestionably a good thing that public
awareness of police brutality has risen in recent years. It is problematic, however,
that the bulk of the attention has focused on police killings of Black men by
White officers, overlooking other forms of violence.295

293. Maher, supra note 141, at 373 (identifying an interviewed officer that stated, “I guess it
couldn’t hurt to have a policy for PSM, but only if it is enforced. The department would have to make it
clear that this type of thing is not tolerated and if you get caught, you get canned”).
294. See Trombadore, supra note 20, at 165.
295. See Andrea J. Ritchie, #sayhername: Racial Profiling and Police Violence Against Black
Women, 41 HARBINGER 187, 190 (2016); Jasmine Sankofa, Mapping the Blank: Centering Black
Women’s Vulnerability to Police Sexual Violence to Upend Mainstream Police Reform, 59 HOW. L.J.
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PSV is also a form of police brutality and should be included in any
discussion addressing police violence against the public. Categorizing PSV and
police brutality separately perpetuates the notion that sexual assault of women
of color and LGBTQ+ people by police officers is a less important problem than
police violence against Black or African American men. By characterizing PSV
differently than police brutality, the media, police departments, and legislatures
“fail to understand sexual assault as structural violence that courts have not
adequately protected against and the sinister history of policing and incarceration
in this country.”296 In order to acknowledge the extent of PSV and the dangers it
poses to victims, law enforcement, and the integrity of the criminal justice
system, dialogue about PSV must be reframed to capture that PSV is a subset of
police brutality. Until the law, police departments, and the media recognize this,
women—specifically women of color—will continue to be treated as secondclass citizens. Therefore, “[o]nly by inserting discussion of [PSV] into the
dominant discourse surrounding police violence can we hope to eliminate the
problem.”297 Furthermore, this inclusion will enrich the broader discussion of
police violence. We cannot fully grasp the problem of police brutality without
acknowledging all forms of police brutality.
2. Acknowledge PSV’s Intersectionality
Any discussion of PSV must expressly acknowledge the intersectional
nature of the violence and victimology. Famously coined by Kimberlé
Crenshaw,298 intersectionality recognizes multiple roots of oppression and
discrimination that can operate simultaneously against a single person. In the
Holtzclaw case, he almost exclusively targeted women of color who came from
low socioeconomic backgrounds and had criminal histories. Each of those
characteristics made them more vulnerable to his assault. The confluence of
several characteristics meant that Holtzclaw identified his victims as unlikely to
meaningfully fight back or report his crimes. As Devon Carbado described
Holtzclaw’s victimology:
The women whom Holtzclaw assaulted were bargaining in the shadow
of their vulnerability and his power. That vulnerability and power
derived from the presumptive legitimacy of police conduct, the
invisibility of sexual assault as a form of police violence, the historical
sexual inviolability of [B]lack women, and that these women were
unlikely icons of victimization around whom the public at large or the
[B]lack community specifically would organize.299
Just as PSV should be included in any discussion of police brutality, it
should also be incorporated into any discussion of #MeToo and sexual violence.
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It is particularly important, however, to acknowledge the profoundly
intersectional victimology of PSV, especially when contrasted to high profile
examples of assault that dominate headlines about #MeToo, often involving
affluent White women. Just as the picture of police brutality should be expanded
beyond White officers killing Black men, the picture of sexual oppression should
be expanded beyond White men assaulting White women.
3. Changing Police Culture
Finally, any discussion of PSV must address and combat police culture’s
hegemonic masculinity. One solution proposed by scholars such as Nancy Leong
is a simple one: encourage police departments to recruit more female officers.
Leong argues this would reduce incidents of excessive force against members of
the public.300 At first blush, this may seem like a simplistic approach, but
diversifying the police force helps disrupt at least some of the dominant
messages and implicit cultural norms among police officers. 301 Notably, any
such efforts cannot simply emphasize gender neutrality in hiring. Rather, as
Valorie Vojdik has advocated, any attempt to make police departments more
gender-diverse should examine the causes of predominantly male police forces
and address all of those causes, including both explicit policies and implicit
norms.302
Second, discussions of police culture and interactions with the public,
regardless of their gender, should take masculinities into account. “Boys will be
boys” is a frequent phrase employed in discussions of misbehavior by the public
and has garnered at least some public criticism. “Men will be men,” however, is
a very different statement, and discussions of the role manliness and masculinity
play in police brutality has been insufficiently incorporated into public
discussion.
Third, policy-makers should ask what measures might disrupt operation of
hegemonic masculinity within police departments. One intriguing and
counterintuitive possibility is to raise the social status of police officers by
increasing their salaries. Although this may seem like an odd response to an issue
of police misconduct, Monica Bell identified the low wages of police officers as
one reason poor communities are deprived of meaningful protection and feel
legal estrangement from the police.303 Professor Bell’s argument that poor
communities would more likely receive the benefits of police protection if police
wages reflected their value in the community also extends to PSV. Masculinities
300.
301.
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buttresses this argument further, as raising the socioeconomic status of police
officers could reduce the perceived need to raise one’s status through
hypermasculine performance.
Finally, the role of the blue wall in police departments’ masculine culture
must be addressed. Because of the blue wall, offending police officers are often
protected from any consequences. Even police officers who do not condone PSV
are nonetheless silent about the issue in the name of loyalty to the brotherhood.304
Accordingly, the blue wall perpetuates the idea that police officers can sexually
assault vulnerable people without fear of expulsion from the police force. The
only way to eliminate the problem is to reduce the effectiveness and protection
of the blue wall. While the blue wall has existed for centuries and undermining
its force will be extremely difficult, the only people who can dismantle the force
of the blue wall are those whose interests it protects: police officials and
administrators.
CONCLUSION
PSV is a deeply rooted problem with shocking prevalence across the
country. Combating PSV will require meaningful legal and cultural changes to
police departments. With a series of targeted reforms, however, such significant
change is possible. Police departments and legislatures should create, adopt, and
advocate for a uniform definition of PSV. Such a definition will help the public
conceptualize the violence and understand the gravity of the problem. This
uniform definition should establish that a person in police custody cannot
consent to sexual activities with a police officer. Additionally, the media, police
departments, and advocates should take measures to ensure PSV is categorized
appropriately in the public eye, namely that PSV is a subset of police brutality
that specifically targets vulnerable groups such as women, the LGBTQ+
community, socioeconomically disadvantaged people, and other marginalized
demographics. This targeting happens as a result of a troubling trend towards
privileging hegemonic masculinity within police culture.
Finally, because PSV appears to be, at least in large part, a result of the
police atmosphere promulgated by ideas of hegemonic masculinity and
unwavering loyalty, police administrators are in the best position to condemn
PSV. To begin that movement, every police department across the nation should
create and enforce policies specifically addressing PSV. These policies must
specifically include a prohibition against the “officer shuffle,” as a policy
without an explicit prohibition will not adequately protect vulnerable people
from PSV. Until these measures are taken, underreporting of PSV and incredibly
rare individual proceedings will continue to be too little and too late.
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